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ARTICLES 
WHEN ARE DAMAGES TAX FREE?: THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF 
“PHYSICAL INJURY” 
Ronald H. Jensen* 
In 1996, Congress reversed nearly seventy-five years of settled law by 
amending § 104(a)(2) of the Code, making damages recovered for personal 
non-physical harms (e.g., emotional distress) taxable.1 Previously, such 
damages had been non-taxable, but after this change became effective on 
August 20, 1996, only damages for personal “physical injuries” or personal 
“physical sickness” continue to qualify for tax-free treatment.2 Surprisingly, 
the skimpy legislative history gives, at best, a limited explanation for this 
startling change in the legislative firmament.3 Equally surprising is 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I would like to express my appreciation to 
Penni Stathakos for her outstanding research assistance in the preparation of this article. I would also 
like to thank Professors Eric A. Lustig and David F. Shores who kindly read a draft of this article and 
made helpful and insightful comments. 
1 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 
(codified at I.R.C. § 104). The statute was enacted on August 20, 1996. Under prior law, the IRS 
recognized as early as 1922 that recoveries of damages for non-physical injuries (e.g., alienation of 
affection, defamation, etc.) were non-taxable. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922). Unless otherwise 
indicated, all references herein to Internal Revenue Code sections are to those sections as they were in 
effect on August 20, 2012. 
2 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 
1838. Section 1605(d), 110 Stat. at 839, makes the change effective for amounts received after the date 
of enactment, i.e., August 20, 1996, except for amounts received pursuant to a binding agreement, court 
decree, or mediation award in effect on or before September 13, 1995. 
3 The relevant committee reports and the portions thereof relevant to the changes made in I.R.C. 
§ 104 are the House Ways and Means Committee Report, H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 142–44 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, 480–82, the Senate Finance Committee Report, S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 
115–16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1589–92, and the House Conference Report, H.R. 
CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–02 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–94. The Senate 
simply proposed to make it clear that all punitive damages were taxable. The House of Representatives 
proposal, in addition to taxing all punitive damages, also limited the exclusion under § 104 of the Code 
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Congress’s decision to base tax treatment on a supposed sharp distinction 
between physical and emotional harms. This decision ignores years of 
scientific research showing that emotional and physical aspects of human 
health are closely intertwined and cannot be easily disentangled.4 
Moreover, the decision to treat damages for emotional distress more harshly 
than damages for physical harm runs counter to the historical trend in tort 
law, which recognizes that emotional distress can be as injurious as 
physical harm (sometimes more so) and therefore should be compensated 
on a similar basis.5 
Congress’s failure to explain its reasons for changing the law or to 
define “physical injury” or “physical sickness,” combined with its apparent 
disregard of scientific learning on the close relationship of the emotional 
and physical aspects of human health, have created a perfect storm resulting 
in great uncertainty in applying the law. Moreover, Congress’s failures and 
oversights have established inequitable differences in the tax treatment of 
individuals suffering the same amount of harm. Nevertheless, taxpayers, the 
IRS, and the courts must apply the new provisions as best they can. The 
purpose of this article is to try to resolve difficult questions that have arisen, 
and are likely to arise, in construing and applying the amendments made by 
Congress in 1996 (hereafter the “1996 Amendments” or the 
“Amendments”). Part I of this article traces the evolution in the tax 
treatment of litigation damages from 1918 through the enactment of the 
1996 Amendments and reviews the various rationales that have been 
offered for such treatment. Part II sets forth a number of hypothetical cases 
illustrating some of the issues created by the 1996 Amendments. Part III 
through Part VI set forth my analyses of these issues. Finally, Part VII 
critiques the 1996 Amendments and makes a proposal that would eliminate 
much of the uncertainty and inequity that the 1996 Amendments created 
while satisfying an apparent concern that led to their enactment. 
                                                                                                                           
 
to recoveries for physical injuries and physical sickness. The Conference Committee adopted the 
changes proposed by the House. All references in the text to the “Committee Report” are to the Report 
of the House Ways and Means Committee. 
4 See infra Part VI. 
5 For cases and illustrations showing the severe pain and hurt that emotional harm can produce, 
see infra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. For a thumbnail sketch of the evolution of the common 
law in relaxing and in some instances eliminating the special limitations on the recovery of damages for 
emotional distress, see infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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I. HISTORY OF TAX TREATMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES 
A. Law Prior to the 1996 Amendments 
Congress enacted the original predecessor of § 104(a)(2) in 1918.6 It 
exempted damages for “personal injuries or sickness” from taxation,7 
apparently because Congress believed it “doubtful” whether such damages 
constituted “income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and 
thus, whether they could constitutionally be taxed.8 Initially, the IRS held 
that only damages for physical injuries were exempt from taxation.9 
However, in 1922, the IRS reversed itself and recognized that damages for 
various non-physical injuries (i.e., alienation of affection, defamation, etc.) 
were likewise tax-exempt.10 Since then, until the 1996 Amendments, it was 
universally held that damages for non-physical personal injuries were 
excludible from income. 
This expansive and liberal interpretation of “personal injury” perhaps 
reached its high water mark in Threlkeld v. Commissioner, which held that 
damages were exempt from tax so long as they were received “on account 
of any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being 
a person in the sight of the law.”11 Under this approach, a violation of a 
person’s human rights (i.e., a right granted by virtue of being a person) was 
deemed a “personal injury” within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and, 
therefore, all damages flowing therefrom, including lost income, were tax-
exempt. This generous approach was significantly curtailed in a trilogy of 
cases decided by the Supreme Court beginning in 1992. 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). 
7 Id. 
8 H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9–10 (1918), reprinted in 94 THE INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 
(Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979). 
9 S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920). 
10 Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922). 
11 Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986), aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). Note that 
under this formulation, monetary damages for breach of contract would not be tax exempt because profit 
under a contract is not guaranteed to a party solely by virtue of being a person but arises from a contract 
negotiated between the parties. Tax-exempt treatment is thus restricted to tort recoveries. 
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The first case, United States v. Burke, involved a female employee of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority who obtained a settlement under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on her claim that she was deprived of 
salary increases because of sex discrimination.12 The Court held the 
settlement was taxable because it failed to satisfy the requirements in the 
Treasury Department regulations limiting tax relief to amounts recovered in 
an action “based upon tort or tort type rights.”13 The Court concluded that 
this criterion was not met because the remedies provided by Title VII were 
too circumscribed in comparison with those in a typical tort action.14 At that 
time, the only remedies under the Act were awarding back pay and granting 
injunctions.15 Thus, the Act failed to provide “for any of the other 
traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and 
suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential 
damages (e.g., a ruined credit rating).”16  
The second case in the trilogy, Commissioner v. Schleier, concerned an 
airline employee who had been terminated by his employer at age sixty in 
accordance with its established employment policy.17 He obtained a 
settlement based on his claim that his termination violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).18 Similar to its ruling 
in Burke, the Court held that the settlement was taxable since it was not 
based upon “tort or tort type rights” in light of the limited remedies ADEA 
provided to age discrimination victims.19 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
13 Id. at 234; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1970). This requirement was deleted from the 
Regulations by a Treasury Decision issued in 2012, T.D. 9573, 2012-12 I.R.B. 498. The Preface to the 
Treasury Decision states that the requirement, which was originally intended to distinguish damages for 
personal injuries from, for example, damages for breach of contract, was rendered unnecessary by the 
1996 Amendments that limit the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) to damages for personal physical injuries 
and physical sickness and by the decision in Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) that requires a 
direct link between the damages and the injuries or sickness. 
14 Burke, 504 U.S. at 241. 
15 Id. at 238–39. 
16 Id. at 239. 
17 515 U.S. 323, 324 (1995). 
18 Id. at 326. 
19 Id. at 334–36. 
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More importantly, for purposes of this article, the Court also held that 
the recovery failed to satisfy the requirement of § 104(a)(2) that the 
recovery be “received on account of” a personal injury.20 The taxpayer, 
relying on Threlkeld, argued that his unjust termination was a “personal 
injury” because it violated a right the law (in this case, the ADEA) accorded 
him as a human being—the right to be free from age discrimination—and 
hence the damages he recovered were nontaxable. But the Court rejected 
this approach, summarily stating that the unjust termination cannot “fairly 
be described as a ‘personal injury.’”21 Instead of defining “personal injury” 
by reference to the wrongful act of the wrongdoer (in this case, the 
employer’s unlawful termination of the taxpayer’s employment), the court 
defined it in terms of the subjective hurt or harm experienced by the 
taxpayer.22 The Court seemed to view “personal injuries” to be of two 
types: (1) harm or hurt to a person’s body and (2) harm or hurt to a person’s 
psyche (i.e., emotional distress).23 While acknowledging that the taxpayer’s 
termination may have caused him psychological pain, the psychological 
pain did not cause his loss of income or affect his recovery. The Court 
explained as follows: 
In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury [i.e., 
psychological pain] and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The 
amount of back wages recovered is completely independent of the existence or 
extent of any personal injury. In short, § 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion 
of respondent’s back wages because the recovery of back wages was not “on 
account” of any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the 
amount of back wages recovered.24 
The Court distinguished the present case from that of a taxpayer, who, 
as a result of an injury sustained in an automobile accident, suffers medical 
expenses, lost wages, pain, and emotional distress for which he 
subsequently recovers monetary damages.25 In that case, the entire amount 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 Id. at 330–31. 
21 Id. at 330.  
22 Id. 
23 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330. 
24 Id. at 330–31. 
25 Id. at 330. 
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of the damages is tax free because his “personal injury” (i.e., the injury to 
his body) caused the medical expenses, the lost wages, and the pain, 
suffering, and emotional harm.26 In contrast, in Schleier’s case, his 
“personal injury,” as defined by the Court (i.e., any psychological pain he 
sustained), did not cause his loss of wages or affect the amount of his 
recovery.27 
The Supreme Court expanded on the “on account of” phraseology in 
O’Gilvie v. United States when it held that punitive damages were taxable.28 
The Court held that punitive damages were not awarded “on account of” the 
taxpayer’s injuries because they were not awarded to compensate the victim 
for his or her injuries, but rather to punish the wrongdoer.29 Thus, they were 
not “awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries.”30 The 
Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that any damages that would not 
have been awarded but for the personal injury were excludible, holding 
instead that the statute required “a stronger causal connection.”31 
B. The 1996 Amendments 
The 1996 Amendments made it clear that punitive damages awarded in 
personal injury cases, with one very narrow exception, were always 
taxable.32 More significantly, for purposes of this article, it restricted tax-
free treatment to recoveries “on account of personal physical injuries or 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Id. at 329–30. However, any amount deducted by the taxpayer under § 213 of the Code 
(relating to medical expenses) in a prior taxable year would be taxable. See also I.R.C. § 104(a) 
(introductory language to the subsection).  
27 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 239–30. 
28 519 U.S. 79 (1996).  
29 Id. at 83–84. 
30 Id. at 83.  
31 Id.  
32 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 
1838 (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). The 1996 Amendments were enacted on August 20, 1996 and thus 
preceded the Supreme Court’s holding in O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996) (decided on 
Dec. 10, 1996) that punitive damages did not qualify for exclusion under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The 1996 
Amendments created a limited exception for punitive damages awarded in certain wrongful death 
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physical sickness.”33 The statute, as amended, explicitly stated that 
“emotional distress” did not qualify as a physical injury or sickness.34 There 
was an exception to this rule for damages for medical expenses attributable 
to the emotional distress (e.g., psychiatric fees), provided the taxpayer had 
not deducted them in a prior taxable year.35 A footnote in the Committee 
Report states, somewhat cryptically, that the “Committee intends that the 
term emotional distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, 
headaches, stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional 
distress.”36 
C. Rationales for the Exclusion Under § 104(a)(2) and for the 1996 
Amendments 
Although formulated in slightly different ways, the principal 
justification for excluding damages for personal injuries from income has 
always been that such recoveries merely try to restore the plaintiff—to the 
extent money can do so—to the same financial, physical, and emotional 
well-being as he or she enjoyed before the injury. Hence, they entail no 
“gain” and therefore may not properly be taxed. In short, the plaintiff’s 
“human capital” is not increased or enhanced but is merely returned to its 
status quo ante.37 Indeed, most people would agree that the plaintiff is never 
made completely “whole” by monetary damages. Given the choice, few 
would be willing to trade, say, one’s arms and legs for any amount of 
money.38 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 
1838 (emphasis added). 
34 I.R.C. § 104(a) (penultimate sentence). 
35 I.R.C. § 104(a) (last sentence).  
36 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 144 n.24 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 482 n.24. 
37 See, e.g., Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 759, 770 (1988) (stating that recipient of damages “has been ‘restored,’ if only by a 
monetary payment, to the status quo. He has not received anything more than he had”). See also 
O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86 (describing purpose of I.R.C. § 104(a) as excluding “those damages that, 
making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, ‘return the victim’s 
personal or financial capital.’”). 
38 This rationale has been vigorously contested. It is contended that this rationale misconceives 
the way gain or loss is computed under the Internal Revenue Code. See Douglas A. Kahn, 
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A second major reason for the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) is 
compassion for the victim.39 Yet another reason asserted for the exclusion is 
to prevent the government from being placed in the seemingly heartless 
position of profiting from the misfortunes of its citizens.40 As one 
commentator states, “[i]f the government were to tax damages for the loss 
of a body part (or for the death of a relative), it would seem to many to have 
engaged in a vulturous act—analogous to feeding off the flesh of a 
dismembered arm or leg or off of the corpse of a recently departed.”41 A 
                                                                                                                           
 
Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 
327, 343 (1995). Gain is not computed by comparing the value of what is given up with the value of 
what is received but is instead determined by comparing the amount received (i.e., the “amount 
realized”) with the taxpayer’s “basis” in the property given up—usually the taxpayer’s cost. I.R.C. 
§ 1001. For example, if A sells Blackacre having a fair market value of $25,000 for $25,000, A cannot 
claim the sale is free from tax on the ground that the sale’s proceeds merely restore him to his financial 
status quo ante (i.e., that the value of what he receives equals the value of what he gave up). Rather the 
taxpayer will normally have taxable gain or loss to the extent that the $25,000 he received exceeds, or is 
less than, what he paid for Blackacre. Opponents of the “return of capital” rationale assert that a 
taxpayer either has no basis in his or her human capital, or alternatively, that the taxpayer must be 
treated as having a zero basis because of the taxpayer’s inability to establish such a basis. Kahn, supra, 
at 343–44; Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 152–53 (1992). Hence, under 
conventional tax principles, the entire amount of the recovery should be taxed.  
Proponents of the “return of capital” rationale reply that using basis to measure gain or loss 
makes sense only when an asset is purchased with after-tax dollars. For example, where a taxpayer uses 
$100, which he or she has earned and paid tax on, to buy an asset, it is appropriate to give the taxpayer a 
$100 basis in the asset so that the taxpayer will not again be taxed on the $100 when he or she sells the 
asset. But basis is irrelevant and inappropriate in the case of assets which the taxpayer acquired without 
the expenditure of previously taxed funds, in particular assets that the taxpayer received free as part of 
the taxpayer’s natural endowment, for example, physical and emotional well-being. Brooks, supra note 
37, at 769–71. These are “personal assets that the Government does not tax and would not have taxed 
had the victim not lost them.” O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996). Here the recovery is not a substitute for 
something that would otherwise have been taxed but instead is something that would never have been 
taxed. Thus, it is argued, a recovery for the loss of these personal assets should not be taxed since it does 
not make the taxpayer better off. Critics respond that this position is akin to arguing that wages should 
be tax free. The receipt of “leisure” is tax free. Thus, under this approach, wages—compensation for 
giving up leisure—should likewise be tax free. Dodge, supra, at 183. 
39 J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury 
Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 43 (1989). Opponents of the exclusion contend, 
however, that it is a very inefficient and indeed inequitable method of helping victims. It does nothing 
for those who presumably suffer the most, that is, victims who recover no damages for their injuries, 
while the exclusion provides the greatest benefit to those presumably best able to bear the loss, that is, 
victims who recover damages and are in the highest income tax brackets. Id. at 43–44.  
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fourth justification is the involuntary nature of the taxpayer’s injury.42 Since 
the taxpayer did not willingly incur his or her injury (e.g., loss of an arm or 
leg), it seems harsh and rapacious to tax a recovery from an injury that the 
taxpayer intensely desired to avoid.43  
The 1996 Amendments seem to reject these rationales in the case of 
damages for nonphysical harm, but they continue to be the basis for 
excluding damages for physical injuries. Nothing in the Committee Report 
on the 1996 Amendments explains why these two types of damages are to 
be treated so differently. Damages awarded for emotional harm attempt to 
return the plaintiff to the same condition as he or she enjoyed before the 
injury, just like the damages for physical injury. If one’s concern is 
compassion for the victim, exclusion seems as justified in the case of one 
suffering severe emotional distress as it does for one experiencing a 
physical injury (which could be relatively minor). Taxing damages for 
severe emotional distress seems as cruel and heartless as taxing damages 
for physical injury. Moreover, taxpayers no more willingly incur emotional 
pain than they do physical injuries.  
What then is the rationale for the 1996 Amendments? Readers seeking 
the answer to this question in the legislative history will be disappointed. 
The Committee Report asserts in its section on “Reasons for Change” that 
“[d]amages received on a claim not involving a physical injury or physical 
sickness are generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits or lost 
wages that would otherwise be included in taxable income.”44 Based on this 
language, one might surmise that the change was simply intended to put the 
claimant in the same position as other taxpayers who must of course pay tax 
on their compensation and profits. If so, the changes in the law are ill suited 
for this purpose. The Amendments tax all damages received for emotional 
distress—not simply the portion attributable to lost taxable income. 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 Id. at 347–48. 
43 Id. As Professor Kahn recognizes, the usual remedy in the Code for an involuntary gain is to 
allow the taxpayer to defer, but not permanently escape, taxation of the gain. Id. Professor Dodge 
contends that “[i]nvoluntariness may be a legitimate rationale for deferral of income . . . but not for total 
and permanent exclusion of a clearly-realized accession to wealth.” Dodge, supra note 38, at 183–84 
(footnotes omitted). 
44 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 481. 
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Furthermore, the 1996 Amendments retain the exclusion for “lost profits” 
and “lost wages” in cases involving a physical injury or sickness. The 
Report provides no justification for the different treatment of lost taxable 
income in these two types of cases. 
Again, one can speculate that Congress was concerned that taxing lost 
income in physical injury cases would create administrative problems since 
jury verdicts typically do not specify the portion of the judgment allocable 
to lost income and the portion allocable to the other types of damage. Or 
maybe Congress was concerned about the political resistance it would 
encounter from the personal injury bar if it attempted to tax awards for lost 
taxable income in physical injury cases. However, the Committee Report 
gives no hint on whether these concerns motivated Congress’s actions. 
Historically, common law courts have been reluctant to award 
damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress—especially 
where no physical injuries are involved. The three principal concerns giving 
rise to this reluctance are succinctly stated in the Second Restatement of 
Torts: 
One is that emotional disturbance which is not so severe and serious as to have 
physical consequences is normally in the realm of the trivial and so falls within 
the maxim that the law does not concern itself with trifles. . . . The second is that 
in the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily 
harm, such emotional disturbance may be too easily feigned, depending, as it 
must, very largely upon the subjective testimony of the plaintiff; and that to 
allow recovery for it might open too wide a door for false claimants who have 
suffered no real harm at all. The third is that where the defendant has been 
merely negligent, without any element of intent to do harm, his fault is not so 
great that he should be required to make good a purely mental disturbance.45 
More recently, however, courts have significantly relaxed, and in some 
cases even eliminated, the impediments to recovery for emotional distress. 
All states today allow recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress under certain circumstances and some have abolished all 
                                                                                                                           
 
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360–61 (5th ed. 1984); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET 
AL., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 18.4, at 796–800 (3d ed. 2007); 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 383 (2d ed. 2011). 
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restrictions on the recovery of such damages.46 Was Congress, in enacting 
the 1996 Amendments, motivated by the same concerns that led common 
law courts in the past to deny or severely limit recovery for emotional 
distress? Once again, the Committee Report is silent on the subject.  
In short, the Committee Report leaves one in a state of utter 
bewilderment as to the purpose or reason for the 1996 Amendments. 
Perhaps the best one can do is observe that Congress said that damages for 
emotional distress, in cases where no physical injuries occur, are “generally 
. . . for lost profits or lost wages that would otherwise be included in taxable 
income,”47 thereby suggesting that Congress’s intent, at least in part, was to 
put such tort victims in this respect on the same footing as other taxpayers 
who must pay tax on their compensation and profits. Beyond that, one 
cannot safely go.  
II. INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE 1996 AMENDMENTS 
Since the amended statute gives no definition of either “physical 
injury” or “physical sickness,” and given the opaqueness of the Committee 
Report, the 1996 Amendments have unsurprisingly created a number of 
issues in interpreting and applying § 104(a)(2). Some of these are illustrated 
by the following cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 For succinct summaries of the evolution of the law regarding negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 308 (Hornbook Series 2000) and Payton v. Abbot 
Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176–78 (Mass. 1982) (describing developments through 1982). For more 
extended treatments, see John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 
MARQ. L. REV. 789, 806–39, 883–906 (2007); KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, § 54; DOBBS ET AL., 
supra note 45, § 393. 
State courts have adopted a variety of approaches on this issue. A very few still limit recovery of 
damages to cases where the defendant’s actions produced a “physical impact” on the plaintiff. A 
majority of the states apparently allow recovery where there is an objective manifestation of the 
emotional distress. Others require only that the plaintiff be in the “zone of danger” of potential bodily 
harm when the tortious conduct occurs. And, as stated in the text, some have eliminated all special 
limitations on recovery of damages for emotional distress. Courts have also adopted a variety of 
approaches in so-called “bystander” cases (e.g., whether a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional 
distress when he or she views physical injury to a loved one). For a comprehensive survey of the current 
law, see Kircher, supra, at 806–39, 883–906. 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 481. 
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Sexual harassment. An employer (“Boss”) fondles his secretary 
(“Secretary”) against her will while she is working on her job. Secretary 
subsequently recovers substantial damages for the battery. Does Boss’s 
fondling of Secretary by itself constitute a “physical injury” or must there 
be some harm to Secretary’s body, for example, a bruise or cut? If bodily 
harm is required, must the harm be of a certain severity, or will any harm, 
no matter how trivial or transient, suffice? Assuming there is bodily harm, 
will all damages recovered for the battery be tax free, or will tax-free 
treatment be limited to the portion of the damages directly attributable to 
the bodily harm?  
False imprisonment. The police wrongfully imprison a citizen 
(“Citizen”). Citizen is handcuffed and jailed. Any attempt by Citizen’s to 
leave custody of the police will be physically prevented, but the police use 
no force to effect Citizen’s imprisonment and he sustains no bodily harm. 
Thereafter, Citizen recovers damages for false imprisonment. Is Citizen’s 
false imprisonment a “physical injury” since his freedom was physically 
restrained? 
Charging bull. A farmer (“Farmer”) negligently allows his bull to 
escape its pen. The bull charges a passing pedestrian (“Pedestrian”) but at 
the last moment the bull is diverted from its path and avoids hitting 
Pedestrian. However, Pedestrian experienced severe emotional distress in 
the form of terror and shock and as a consequence suffered a heart attack.48 
Pedestrian recovers damages for emotional distress (i.e., terror and horror 
from the bull’s charge) and for the heart attack (i.e., medical expenses, pain 
and suffering, loss of income because of his resulting inability to work, 
diminution in his quality of life, etc.). Are the damages for the heart attack 
tax free because the heart attack is a “physical injury” or are they taxable 
because they had their origin in, and were caused by, emotional distress?  
Post-traumatic stress disorder. A man, who secured access to a guest’s 
(“Guest”) motel room because the lock was defective, robbed Guest at 
gunpoint in her room. As a result, Guest sustains a condition that is 
medically diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Guest’s 
PTSD is manifested by flashbacks, nightmares, and inability to concentrate, 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 This hypothetical was suggested by the facts of Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1958), 
overruled by Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970). 
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but also by physical phenomena including palpitations, shortness of breath, 
tremor, nausea, insomnia and pain. Guest is still suffering from these 
afflictions two years following the incident. Are the damages she recovers 
from the motel owner for the physical manifestations of PTSD excludible 
from income because they are “physical injuries” or are they taxable 
because they are merely symptoms of emotional distress? Is it relevant that 
physical processes occurring within the body (i.e., excessive production of 
certain neurotransmitters in the brain) produce these physical phenomena? 
What if it is shown that the persistence of these symptoms results from 
detrimental physical changes occurring in the brain? 
III. WHAT IS A “PHYSICAL INJURY”? 
Although the term “physical injury” may initially seem self-evident, its 
meaning becomes increasingly elusive upon examination. This section 
discusses some plausible definitions of this term. 
A. A “Physical Injury” Is a Physical Impairment of the Body 
Everyone seems to agree that physical harm to the body constitutes a 
“physical injury.” Thus, the latest edition of Black’s Dictionary defines 
“bodily injury” (which it equates to “physical injury”) as “[p]hysical 
damage to a person’s body.”49 The Third Restatement of Torts defines 
“bodily harm” as “physical impairment of the human body.”50 Under the 
Restatement’s usage, the phrase “bodily harm” encompasses “illness, 
disease, impairment of bodily function, and death” as well as “physical 
injury.”51 An earlier edition of Black’s Dictionary, drawing on case law, 
defined “physical injury” as “bodily harm or hurt, excluding mental 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009). 
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 4 
(2010). 
51 Id. Although § 104(a)(2) of the Code refers to “physical sickness” as well as to “physical 
injury,” the term “physical sickness” is rarely, if ever, discussed in either the cases or the literature as a 
separate legal concept; in practice both concepts are subsumed in the term “physical injury.” Under the 
terminology of the Third Restatement, a physical sickness would be an illness or disease manifested by 
a physical impairment of the human body. 
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distress, fright, or emotional disturbance.”52 The IRS adopted this latter 
definition in a private letter ruling issued in 2000; indeed it appears that the 
IRS adopted it as the exclusive definition of “physical injury.”53 
In that ruling—the so-called “bruise ruling”—the taxpayer’s driver 
engaged in a series of attempts to make sexual contact with the taxpayer on 
her business trips, culminating in his actual touching of taxpayer’s body.54 
Initially these contacts did not result in any observable bodily harm. A 
subsequent physical contact caused the taxpayer extreme pain but again no 
observable bodily harm (“First Pain Incident”).55 Ultimately, the employer 
assaulted taxpayer, both cutting and biting her (“First Physical Injury”).56 
Drawing upon the definition of physical injury in Black’s Dictionary, the 
ruling holds that “direct unwanted or uninvited physical contact resulting in 
observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling and bleeding are 
personal physical injuries.”57 Therefore, the damages recovered by taxpayer 
that were attributable to the period beginning with the First Physical Injury 
were tax free, but damages attributable to events prior to the First Pain 
Incident were not.58 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). 




57 Id. Although the ruling refers to “observable bodily harms,” it is generally understood that the 
injury need not be visible to the naked eye; it is sufficient if the injury can be verified by objective 
means. See G. Christopher Wright, Comment, Taxation of Personal Injury Awards: Addressing the 
Mind/Body Dualism That Plagues § 104(a)(2) of the Tax Code, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 211, 238 (2010) 
(stating that it is sufficient if the “injury can be demonstrated, for example, by an x-ray or other 
objective evidence”). I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200121031 (May 25, 2001) held that lung cancer caused 
though the inhalation of asbestos was a “physical injury” even though damage to the lungs could not be 
observed from outside the body. 
58 Because of its ruling policy, under § 7.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-1, the IRS declined to rule on 
whether the pain the taxpayer experienced during the First Pain Incident was a physical injury. I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000). As the ruling noted, the perception of “pain” is subjective and 
thus an inherently factual matter on which the IRS will not issue rulings. Id. In my opinion, pain, by 
itself, should not be treated as a physical injury. Pain is a “feeling” and thus is more akin to an emotion 
than what one normally thinks of as a “physical injury.” The definitions of physical injury cited in the 
text emphasize damage to, or impairment of, the body. However, one can have pain without any 
accompanying damage to the body, as apparently was the case in the First Pain Incident. Moreover, 
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Although it is undisputed that the cuts and bruises sustained by the 
taxpayer in the above ruling constituted “physical injuries,” some 
commentators have argued or suggested that the IRS approach is too 
narrow and restrictive. For example, some have suggested that damages 
recovered for any unwanted touching of a person may be tax free regardless 
of whether the person touched suffers any bodily harm.59 The remainder of 
this Part discusses several theories that arguably support this approach. 
B. A Physical Injury Occurs When a Violation of the Taxpayer’s Legal 
Rights Is Effected Through Physical Means 
Perhaps the definition of “injury” the IRS uses is too colloquial. After 
all, “injury” has a special meaning in the law: a “violation of another’s legal 
right, for which the law provides a remedy.”60 Likewise, the Second 
Restatement of Torts distinguishes “injury,” which it defines as the 
“invasion of any legally protected interest of another,”61 from a “harm” 
which is the “loss or detriment” suffered by the victim.62 Using this 
terminology, the victim’s “injury” in the bruise ruling was not her cuts and 
bruises (these were “harms”) but rather the perpetrator’s invasion of her 
right to be free of an offensive touching of her body. According to 
Blackstone, “every man’s person [is] sacred, and no other [has] a right to 
meddle with it, in [] the slightest manner.”63 Since this invasion of the 
taxpayer’s right was “physical,” in the sense that it was accomplished by 
the physical actions of the perpetrator, the touching itself, even in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
abuse. For example, would any pain suffice, or must the pain be of a certain magnitude? If the latter, 
how would one determine whether the taxpayer’s pain crossed the requisite threshold? Also a taxpayer 
could easily assert that there was pain, and it would be difficult to verify or disprove that assertion. 
There appears to be no case or ruling holding that pain, without any accompanying damage to the body, 
is a physical injury. 
59 See, e.g., J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury 
Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 186 (1997) (stating that where Boss 
fondles Secretary, she “arguably has a claim that has its origin in a personal physical injury, i.e., the 
unwanted touching.”). 
60 BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 458 (3d ed. 2011). 
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965). 
62 Id. § 7(2). 
63 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001). 
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absence of bodily harm, could plausibly be characterized as a “physical 
injury”—a violation of her legal right effected through physical means. 
Under this approach, the physical injury in the bruise ruling occurred when 
the employer first touched her against her will—even though no bodily 
harm occurred at that time. 
Moreover, courts have on occasion defined “physical injury” in this 
manner in tort cases. In one bizarre—possibly humorous—case, the court 
found there was “physical injury” where a circus horse evacuated his 
bowels into plaintiff’s lap causing her embarrassment, mortification and 
mental suffering, but no “physical hurt.”64 The court explained: “Any 
unlawful touching of a person’s body, although no actual physical hurt may 
ensue therefrom, yet, since it violates a personal right, constitutes a physical 
injury to that person.”65 Note that this analysis focuses on the actions of the 
defendant (more precisely, defendant’s horse) rather than the subjective 
harm experienced by the plaintiff. 
Could a similar analysis be applied to § 104(a)(2) so that the physical 
injury would be deemed to occur in a sexual harassment case when an 
employer gropes or fondles the employee even in the absence of bodily 
harm? This is unlikely following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Schleier.66 In that case, the Court rejected the holding in Threlkeld that a 
“personal injury” was “any invasion of the rights that an individual is 
granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law,”67 and held 
instead a taxpayer’s injuries are the harms or hurts he or she subjectively 
experiences.68 Therefore, in the case of the employee fondled or groped by 
her employer, the “injury” she sustained was not her employer’s violation 
of her legal right not to be touched against her will. Rather it was her 
feelings of humiliation, degradation, shame and embarrassment resulting 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928), overruled by OB-
GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ga. 1989), overruled in part by Lee v. State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E. 2d 82 (Ga. 2000). 
65 Christy Bros., 144 S.E. at 681 (emphasis added). See also S. Brilliant Coal Co. v. Williams, 91 
So. 589, 591 (Ala. 1921) (stating that where defendant kicked plaintiff, “[i]n a legal sense it was a 
physical injury, though it may have caused no physical suffering . . . .”). 
66 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
67 Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986), aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). 
68 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330–31. 
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from the unwanted touching, and since these “injuries” are not “physical,” 
no exclusion is allowable under § 104(a)(2). 
C. Any Unwanted Touching of a Person’s Body Constitutes a “Physical 
Injury” by Analogy to the Common Law “Impact Rule” 
In Burke, the Supreme Court recognized that “common law tort law 
concepts are helpful in deciding whether a taxpayer is being compensated 
for a ‘personal injury.’”69 Similarly, one commentator has suggested that in 
“questionable situations under amended § 104(a)(2)” it might be useful “to 
study the common law rules with respect to negligent infliction of 
emotional distress,” including the common law “impact rule.”70 
Historically courts awarded damages for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress only if the defendant made or caused a “physical impact” 
on the plaintiff.71 However, the courts came to apply this standard so 
loosely that it allowed recovery even where that impact caused no bodily 
harm (i.e., a physical impairment of the body).72 Thus, if the 1996 
Amendments are interpreted by reference to the “impact rule,” there would 
be a “physical injury” whenever the defendant’s actions resulted in an 
unwanted “impact” on the plaintiff—even in the absence of bodily harm. 
This approach should be rejected outright. Even if one believes that state 
tort law concepts are relevant in interpreting the 1996 Amendments, resort 
to the “impact rule” would nonetheless be unjustified, since the “impact 
rule” simply does not reflect current tort law. Although it is difficult to 
determine exact numbers, a 1982 case put the number of states still 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992) (quoting with approval Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 
1305, aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
70 Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion: An Analysis and Update, 75 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 61, 78 (1997). 
71 KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, at 363–64; HARPER ET AL., supra note 45, at 800. However, 
courts have allowed recovery where the defendant intentionally inflicted the emotional distress even 
where there is no impact or bodily harm. HARPER ET AL., supra note 45, at 800. 
72 HARPER ET AL., supra note 45, at 801 (stating that courts have found rule satisfied “by the most 
trivial of impacts”). See also Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961), where the 
court stated that the impact rule was satisfied if there was “physical impact in any degree, no matter how 
slight” and if there was such an impact, recovery for emotional distress would be allowed “regardless of 
whether there is any physical injury manifested.” 
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adhering to the “impact rule” at five,73 while a 2007 article put the number 
at six.74 
The impact rule is inconsistent with the methodology adopted by the 
Supreme Court. In Schleier,75 the Court emphasized the need for a strong 
causal relationship between the taxpayer’s harm or injury and the damages 
he or she recovered. Under the “impact rule,” however, recovery is allowed 
even when the causal relationship between the “impact” and the damages 
allowed is exceedingly attenuated and possibly non-existent. According to 
one leading treatise on torts, that “courts have found ‘impact’ in minor 
contacts with the person which often play no part in causing the real harm 
and in themselves can have no importance whatever.”76  
Moreover, the state courts themselves recognize that the “impact” 
required by the rule often produces no “physical injury.” Nevertheless, they 
allow recovery even in these cases.77 For example, some courts have held 
that ingestion of a contaminated foreign substance permits recovery for 
emotional distress—even if it causes no “physical injury”—because the 
ingestion itself is an “impact.”78 Florida explicitly recognizes this 
dichotomy between physical injuries and physical impacts: “If the plaintiff 
has suffered an impact, Florida courts permit recovery for emotional 
distress [even in the absence of physical injury] . . . . If, however, the 
plaintiff has not suffered an impact, the complained–of mental distress must 
be ‘manifested by physical injury,’ . . . .”79 If the federal courts applying 
federal tax law are to defer to state law by applying the “impact rule” to 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 n.6 (Mass. 1982).  
74 Kircher, supra note 46, at 810 n.113.  
75 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329–31 (1995) (denying exclusion for taxpayer’s recovery 
of back pay because any psychological pain he suffered from being unlawfully fired did not cause him 
to lose the pay). In O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996), the Court held that § 104(a)(2) 
of the Code required a “stronger causal connection” than mere “but-for” causation. 
76 KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, at 363 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). 
77 See, e.g., Zelinsky, 175 A.2d at 353 (stating that if there is an impact, recovery for emotional 
distress is allowed “regardless of whether there is any physical injury manifested.”). 
78 Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2001).  
79 Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC., 967 So. 2d 846, 850 (Fla. 2007) (quoting with approval 
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). 
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§ 104(a)(2), they should, by the same token, respect a state’s determination 
that an impact is not a “physical injury,” and accordingly disallow the tax 
exclusion in those cases. 
On the other hand, courts applying the “impact rule” have refused to 
allow recovery where the emotional harm resulted in serious bodily harm. 
In a famous early New York case (since overruled), defendant’s team of 
horses bore down upon plaintiff but ultimately did not touch her.80 
Nevertheless, the experience caused her severe shock resulting in a loss of 
consciousness and a miscarriage.81 The court denied recovery because, 
among other reasons, there was no impact.82 
Due to the capricious manner in which the “impact rule” was 
applied—allowing recovery in the absence of bodily harm in some cases 
and denying recovery where serious bodily harm ensued in others—
virtually all jurisdictions have abandoned it.83 It should not be used as a 
template for applying § 104(a)(2), since it is an obsolete and irrational rule 
that is rarely followed today and runs counter to the Supreme Court’s 
approach in Schleier. 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 176 
N.E. 2d 729 (N.Y. 1961). See also Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1958), overruled by 
Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897) 
(dictum). 
81 Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354. 
82 Id. at 354–55. The court expressed concern that allowing recovery without an “impact” would 
result in “a flood of litigation in cases where the [alleged] injury . . . may be easily feigned.” Id. The 
court also found that the miscarriage was not the “proximate result of defendant’s negligence” because it 
could not have been “reasonably anticipated.” Id. at 355. The court in Bosley, 142 A.2d at 266–67, 
expressed similar concerns: if recovery allowed it would “open a Pandora’s box” and invite 
“tremendous number of illusory or imaginative or ‘faked’” claims which could not be detected or 
disproved by medical science.  
83 See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1983) (stating rule abandoned 
because the impact requirement had become “purely formal” as it was satisfied by “minor physical 
contacts which in reality were insignificant and played trivial or no part in causing harm to the 
plaintiff.”); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. 1982) (referring to the “arbitrariness of 
the impact rule”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 45, § 393 (after noting cases where recovery was denied for 
serious physical injury caused by emotional distress because there was no impact, the stated rule was 
abandoned because it “did not draw the line against liability at a satisfactory place . . . .”). 
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D. False Imprisonment Constitutes a “Physical Injury”—Even If There Is 
No Bodily Harm—Because the Taxpayer’s Freedom Is Physically 
Restrained 
In the hypothetical case above involving false imprisonment, the 
victim did not suffer any harm to his body. One commentator, a prolific 
writer on the taxation of damages, has vigorously argued that false 
imprisonment under these circumstances still constitutes a “physical 
injury.”84 He asserts that the taxpayer was “injured” (i.e., he lost his 
freedom) and that such “injury” was clearly “physical”: “It is hard to 
imagine a more obvious degree of physicality than being physically 
confined behind bars. Even if no bruises or broken bones befall the plaintiff 
while behind bars, it seems axiomatically physical to be physically 
confined.”85 This approach classifies the nature of the taxpayer’s “injury” 
based on the means used to produce that injury. Hence, the “injury” is said 
to be “physical” since physical means are used to deprive the victim of 
freedom. This approach seems at odds with that taken by the Supreme 
Court in Schleier, which defined a taxpayer’s “injury” in terms of the 
“harm” he or she suffers rather than the actions of the wrongdoer. In 
Schleier, the taxpayer argued that his “injury” was the unlawful termination 
of his employment by the employer, but the Court rejected this approach 
out of hand holding that his “injuries” were the harms he suffered by being 
terminated (i.e., loss of income and psychological pain).86 Following this 
approach, the “injury” in a false imprisonment case is the victim’s loss of 
freedom—arguably a psychological harm—authorities used to effectuate 
that harm. 
One might argue, consistent with Schleier, that the harm to the victim 
is nonetheless physical, since the victim’s power of locomotion—a physical 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 See ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS (4th 
ed. 2009); Robert W. Wood, Tax Aspects of Settlements and Judgments, 522-3d TAX MGMT. PORT. 
(BNA) (2012). The following articles by Mr. Wood specifically address the tax treatment of damages 
recovered for false imprisonment: Robert H. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, 119 
TAX NOTES 279 (2008); Robert H. Wood, Why False Imprisonment Recoveries Should Not Be Taxable, 
123 TAX NOTES 1217 (2009); Robert H. Wood, Should False Imprisonment Damages Be Taxable?, 81 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 38 (2009) [hereinafter False Imprisonment].  
85 False Imprisonment, supra note 84, at 38. 
86 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330–31 (1995). 
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capacity—is restricted by the false imprisonment. This argument will 
probably not succeed. First, it is too far removed from the commonly 
accepted definition of “physical injury”: damage to, or impairment of, the 
human body. In the case under consideration, there was no damage to the 
taxpayer’s body at all. 
Moreover, the legislative history of § 104(a)(2) suggests that factors 
restricting a taxpayer’s ability to fully exercise or enjoy his or her body’s 
powers that are outside or external to the taxpayer’s body do not amount to 
a “physical injury.” The Committee Report notes that the exclusion under 
§ 104(a)(2) may apply even where the recipient of the damages sustains no 
“physical injury,” so long as such damages are received “on account of” 
somebody’s physical injury.87 Hence, damages “received [by a taxpayer] on 
account of a claim of loss of consortium due to the physical injury . . . of 
such individual’s spouse are excludible from gross income.”88 For purposes 
of this article, it is important to note that the requisite “physical injury” is 
not the taxpayer’s loss of opportunity to have sexual intercourse with his or 
her spouse; rather it is the injury that rendered the taxpayer’s spouse 
incapable of having sex. In the eyes of the Committee Report, the taxpayer 
suffered no “physical injury”; the spouse did. Therefore, it seems that a 
person will be considered to have a “physical injury” only where there is a 
physical impairment of that person’s body. A limitation on a taxpayer’s 
ability to fully exercise or enjoy his or her bodily powers due to external 
factors (that is, factors outside the taxpayer’s own body) does not constitute 
a “physical injury” to the taxpayer. 
The one case thus far to consider this issue, Stadnyk v. Commissioner, 
correctly held that “physical restraint and physical detention are not 
‘physical injuries’ for purposes of section 104(a)(2).”89 Unfortunately, the 
Tax Court apparently based its decision in part on state law that 
characterized the interest protected by the tort of false imprisonment as “in 
large part a mental one.”90 This was inappropriate since terms used in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143–44 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 481–82. 
88 Id. at 144, reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 482. 
89 Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 475, 478, 2008 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2008-289, aff’d, 367 
Fed. Appx. 586 (6th Cir. 2010). 
90 Id. (quoting Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)). 
  
108 | P i t t s b u r g h  T a x  R e v i e w  |  V o l .  1 0  2 0 1 3  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2013.15 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
Internal Revenue Code, such as “physical injury,” should normally be 
decided using federal criteria rather than varying state characterizations, “so 
as to give a uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation.”91  
E. Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, “physical injury” means physical damage 
or impairment to one’s body. 
IV. WHERE A TORT INVOLVES A PHYSICAL INJURY, ARE ALL DAMAGES 
RECOVERED FOR THAT TORT AUTOMATICALLY TAX FREE OR MAY AN 
APPORTIONMENT BE REQUIRED? 
Let’s reconsider an expanded version of the sexual harassment 
hypothetical discussed above. Boss engages in a pattern of sexual 
harassment toward his female Secretary; the harassment consists of making 
lewd comments and fondling her. The fondling results in a slight bruise, 
which clears up in a few days, but her emotional distress arising from this 
incident—her feelings of humiliation, degradation, shame, and 
embarrassment—persist. Secretary brings an action for common law battery 
and obtains a substantial recovery. Only a small portion of her emotional 
distress is attributable to the bruise; indeed she would have experienced 
much of the same emotional distress had there been no bruise.92 Should the 
entire recovery be tax free, since she had incurred a “physical injury” or 
                                                                                                                           
 
91 Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938) (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 
(1932)). 
92 Feminist scholars recognize that significant harm and suffering results from sexual 
discrimination and harassment even in the absence of physical injury and therefore condemn § 104(a)(2) 
of the Code for limiting the tax exclusion to instances of physical injury. See Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, 
and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1456–60 (2000) 
(describing ill-effects resulting from sexual discrimination even when no physical injury occurs); Marisa 
J. Mead, Taxing the Victims: Compensatory Damage Awards and Attorneys’ Fees in Sexual Harassment 
Lawsuits, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 801, 848 (2003) (arguing that a “victim of discrimination suffers a 
dehumanizing injury as real as, and often far more severe and lasting harm than, a blow to the jaw.” 
(quoting Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1232 (3d. Cir. 1994))); Laura Sager & 
Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, 
Congress and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 502 (1998) (stating that “[v]ictims of 




V o l .  1 0  2 0 1 3  |  T a x - F r e e  D a m a g e s  |  1 0 9  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2013.15 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
should only that portion of the recovery directly attributable to the bruise be 
tax free? 
Let’s consider a less emotion-laden example. A national producer 
(“Producer”) of cottage cheese distributes cartons containing broken glass. 
A customer (“Customer”) buys a carton, places the cottage cheese in her 
mouth and discovers the presence of the glass. The glass causes a small cut 
on the side of her mouth. The cut heals in a short period of time, but 
Customer remains terrified that she may have swallowed some of the 
broken glass. Although the cut may have intensified Customer’s fear, she 
would have been afraid even if she were not cut.93 It is subsequently 
verified that in fact she did not swallow any glass. Customer obtains a 
substantial recovery from Producer for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Should all of her recovery be tax free or only that portion of the 
recovery that is attributable to the additional emotional distress that she 
experienced by reason of the cut? 
None of the commentators seem to have directly addressed this issue. 
However, Private Letter Ruling 200041022 (the bruise ruling), although not 
explicit on this point, seems to hold—without discussion—that all damages 
allocable to the period beginning when the victim suffered her physical 
injuries (i.e., cuts, bruises, swelling and bleeding) are excludible from 
income.94 I, on the other hand, believe that an apportionment is required, 
first because the statute and Supreme Court precedent mandate it, and 
secondly because an apportionment best implements the policy of the 1996 
Amendments. 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 This is shown by cases where plaintiffs have sought damages for emotional distress even 
though they did not incur any cuts or other physical harm. For example, see Tuttle v. Meyer Dairy 
Prods. Co., 138 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), where evidence showed plaintiff ate three-quarters of 
the cottage cheese in a container before she encountered a piece of glass whereupon she expelled the 
glass from her mouth without cutting or scratching herself. Id. at 429. She testified: “I don’t claim that I 
[swallowed any glass], but I didn’t know. It was the worrying and shock of not knowing whether you 
swallowed it or not.” Id. at 430. Although the defendant acknowledged that plaintiff suffered “fright, 
apprehension and mental anguish,” the court dismissed her claim because she had not suffered any 
“contemporaneous physical injury.” Id. at 429–30. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A 
illus. 1 (1965). 
94 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000). The Ruling states that “damages that [the 
taxpayers] received under the Settlement Agreement for pain, suffering, emotional distress and 
reimbursement of medical expenses that are properly allocable to the period beginning with the First 
Physical Injury are excludable . . . .” 
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Damages recovered for emotional distress that exist independently of 
the physical injury are simply not recovered “on account of” that physical 
injury.95 In such a case, recovery of damages for this type of emotional 
distress does not even satisfy the “but-for” test of causation, since the 
emotional distress would have occurred if there had been no physical 
injury. The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie held that § 104(a)(2) requires a 
“stronger causal connection” than the “but-for” test.96 A fortiori, the portion 
of the damages for emotional distress that would have occurred even in the 
absence of a physical injury may not be excluded from gross income. 
Analogous decisions under the Warsaw Convention, which governs 
the liability of an international air carrier when its passenger sustains a 
“bodily injury,” support this approach.97 The mainstream view adhered to 
by all courts that have considered the issue (save one district court) is that 
“recovery for mental injuries is permitted only to the extent the [emotional] 
distress is caused by the physical injuries sustained.”98 
The case of In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 1999 
(Lloyd v. American Airlines) (“Lloyd”) illustrates this approach.99 In that 
case, a passenger’s leg was punctured and scraped in a crash by bolts from 
an airplane seat.100 In addition, she suffered tendinitis when other seats fell 
                                                                                                                           
 
95 Cf. Longo v. Air France, No. 95 CV 0292 (BDP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21947, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996) (stating that “[a]llegations of mental distress that is unrelated to physical 
injury—i.e., mental distress that does not flow from physical injury or that does not flow from the 
physical manifestations of mental distress—are no different from . . . pure mental injury claims . . . .”). 
96 O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996). 
97 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by 
Air, art. 17, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876. Although the only authentic text of the 
Convention is in French, the Supreme Court held that the relevant French phrase in the treaty—lesion 
corporelle—is properly translated as “bodily injury.” Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535–
42 (1991). 
98 Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, 360 F.3d 366, 376 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Air Crash at Little 
Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999 (Lloyd v. Am. Airlines), 291 F.3d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 2002). The Ehrlich 
court states that of all the courts to consider this issue, only two district courts had taken a contrary 
position. However, one of those cases was the district court decision in Lloyd v. American Airlines, 
which was reversed on appeal on this issue and therefore is no longer “good law.” That leaves the 
district court decision in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on October 11, 1994, 954 F. Supp. 
175 (N.D. Ill 1997), as the only case not yet reversed that would allow recovery for emotional distress 
not attributable to a physical injury. 
99 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 291 F.3d at 510. 
100 Id. at 507. 
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on her knee.101 After the crash, she became anxious and nervous, and her 
condition was diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD] and a 
major depressive disorder.102 At trial, a psychiatrist testified that the 
physical injuries to the passenger’s legs were a factor in her PTSD and 
depression, but later testified that her experience in the crash, when she 
believed she was going to die, was so terrifying that he thought she would 
have developed PTSD without sustaining the knee injury.103 
The court concluded that it was “clear that some of her emotional 
trauma can be fairly traced to [her physical] injuries, albeit much less than 
would account for the $6.5 million” awarded by the jury.104 The court 
remanded the case for a new trial but permitted the plaintiff to forego a new 
trial if she accepted a final judgment of $1.5 million, an amount the court 
found “more in line with [the] evidence presented at trial.”105 In short, 
damages for emotional trauma that would have resulted even in the absence 
of a physical injury were not recoverable. 
Unlike § 104(a)(2), the Warsaw Convention does not explicitly impose 
a causation requirement. Indeed, the Second Circuit found that the text of 
the Convention was susceptible of different interpretations on this issue.106 
Thus, the case for requiring an allocation under § 104(a)(2)—which 
explicitly requires causation107—is stronger than under the Warsaw 
Convention. A principal reason why courts have required causation in 
Warsaw Convention cases, despite the absence of a clear mandate to do so, 
is to prevent anomalous and illogical results. In the absence of an 
apportionment, a passenger incurring a minor physical injury—even one 





104 Id. at 512. 
105 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 291 F.3d.at 513. 
106 Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 379 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the Warsaw 
Convention was “susceptible to more than one interpretation” on this issue). 
107 Indeed, the Supreme Court held that mere “but-for” causation does not satisfy the requirement 
in § 104(a)(2) of the Code that damages be paid “on account of” the injury” holding instead that the 
section requires “a stronger causal connection.” O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996). 
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unrelated to her emotional distress—would be allowed full recovery for 
such distress, while a co-passenger who suffered the same amount of 
emotional distress, but no physical injury, would receive nothing.108 The 
danger of anomalous and illogical results is equally likely under § 104(a)(2) 
if no apportionment is required; a taxpayer who suffers a minor physical 
injury would completely avoid tax on her recovery for her emotional 
distress (as well as any other damages she receives), while a taxpayer who 
suffers the same amount of emotional distress but no physical injury would 
be taxed on her entire recovery. This approach might be called the “all-or-
nothing-approach”: if there is a physical injury, all damages (except for 
punitive damages) are excluded; if no physical injury, nothing is excluded.  
The language of the Committee Report appears to support the need for 
an apportionment. The Report notes that if “an action has its origin in 
physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages (other than punitive 
damages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account 
of physical injury or physical sickness . . . .”109 The language seems to say 
that only damages (including damages for emotional distress) that “flow” 
from the physical injury or physical sickness are excludible. Conversely, 
damages for emotional distress that do not “flow” from the physical injury 
or physical sickness will be taxable. The language reiterates the point the 
Supreme Court made in Schleier, rephrased however to reflect the new 
requirement of a physical injury or sickness: damages including damages 
for emotional distress will be excludible if, but only if, such damages are 
caused by, that is, flow from, a “physical injury or physical sickness.”110  
The strongest objection to requiring apportionment in these 
circumstances is that it creates a severe administrative problem. How can 
one possibly determine the portion of a recovery for emotional distress 
attributable to the physical injury and the portion not so attributable? Such 
an apportionment seems to require the fact finder to determine how much 
emotional distress the taxpayer would have experienced had there been no 
physical injury—a daunting task. However, this task does not seem 
impossible. The court in Lloyd was able to make such an apportionment. 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 Ehrlich, 360 F.3d at 386. 
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Moreover, this apportionment is only one of many difficult apportionments 
required in applying § 104(a)(2). Private Letter Ruling 200041022 (the 
bruise ruling) itself requires difficult apportionments. In that Ruling, the 
taxpayer filed an action seeking damages for emotional and physical harm 
arising out of a pattern of sexual harassment and reserved the right to seek 
punitive damages.111 The agreement settling the action made no allocation 
of damages.112 The Ruling held that (1) any damages properly allocable to 
punitive damages were taxable; (2) any damages allocable to the period 
preceding the infliction of physical injuries were also taxable; but (3) 
damages allocable to the period beginning with the physical injuries were 
non-taxable.113 The ruling therefore requires three separate allocations. Note 
that an allocation will always be required in every action seeking both 
damages for physical injury and punitive damages since punitive damages 
are always taxable. An allocation will also be required where emotional 
distress is experienced both before and after the physical injuries. 
In another case, the defendant settled an action for a physical injury he 
was alleged to have inflicted on the taxpayer.114 The taxpayer made several 
covenants in the settlement agreement: (1) not to defame the defendant; (2) 
not to disclose the existence and terms of the settlement agreement; (3) not 
to publicize the incident; and (4) not to assist in any criminal proceeding 
against defendant arising from the incident.115 The court apportioned 
$80,000 of the $200,000 settlement to the covenants, which was therefore 
taxable, and the balance to the alleged physical injury.116 It would appear 
that such covenants are common in settlement agreements and thus will 
frequently trigger a need to make an apportionment. Also, when an 
employee recovers damages, a determination of the portion properly 
                                                                                                                           
 
111 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Amos v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 663, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2003-329 (2003).  
115 Id. at 667. 
116 Id. 
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allocable to back pay or as compensation for loss of future pay will often be 
required to compute the amount of the applicable employment taxes.117 
In short, making an apportionment between emotional distress actually 
caused by the physical injuries and emotional distress not so caused is 
simply another of the difficult apportionments required in applying 
§ 104(a)(2), especially after the 1996 Amendments.118 Nothing in the 
statute or in policy justifies ignoring or avoiding this type of apportionment. 
On the contrary, requiring such an apportionment would mean, in general, 
that the greater the severity of the physical harm, the greater the amount of 
the tax exclusion. This would further, rather than defeat, the policy of the 
1996 Amendments. 
Limiting the exclusion for emotional distress damages to the portion 
actually caused by the physical injury has certain benefits. Consider two 
women who are subjected to the same degree of unwanted physical 
touching by their respective employers. One sustains a minor bruise, while 
the other, who is less susceptible to bruising, receives none. It seems clear 
that the woman who has no bruise cannot exclude any of her damages from 
taxable income. However, under the all-or-nothing approach, the other 
woman would be able to exclude both her recovery for emotional distress 
                                                                                                                           
 
117 Rev. Rul. 78-336, 1978-2 C.B. 255 (payment of back pay is subject to income tax 
withholding); Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 200244004 (June 19, 2002) (payment of back pay is subject to income tax 
withholding, FICA and FUTA); Rev. Rul. 78-176, 1978-1 C.B. 303 (payment for loss of pay from 
prospective employment is subject income tax withholding, FICA and FUTA); Abbott v. United States, 
76 F. Supp. 2d 236 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that payment for loss of future income not qualifying for 
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion was subject to Social Security tax). However, the IRS does not regard 
payments of back pay or for loss of future pay as subject to employment taxes if they are excludible 
from gross income pursuant to § 104(a)(2) of the Code. I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 200244004 (June 19, 2002) 
(stating there is “general agreement that . . . damages . . . excludable from gross income under section 
104(a)(2) . . . are not subject to employment taxes. See Temp. Reg. [§] 32.1.”). With the enactment of 
the 1996 Amendments, which require either a physical injury or physical sickness, there will be fewer 
cases qualifying for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. Even if there is an injury or sickness, the direct causal 
link between the injury or sickness and such damages required by Schleier will often be lacking. See 
Wood, supra note 84, III.E.4.c. (discussing the practical problems encountered by employers in 
complying with the rules on employment taxes). 
118 See Burke & Friel, supra note 59, 189–93. The authors suggest it may be necessary in the case 
of awards made taxable by the 1996 Amendments to determine the portion of such awards that is 
properly taxable as back pay or lost self-employment income to compute the amount of payroll tax due. 
They also describe the difficulties the IRS will encounter in determining a proper allocation in cases 
involving multiple causes of action where some claims give rise to amounts that are tax exempt under 
§ 104(a)(2) of the Code and others do not. 
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(including the emotional distress she would have experienced even if she 
had not been bruised) and all other damages she recovers. The 
apportionment approach eliminates this unfair disparity in treatment by 
limiting the tax exclusion to just the damages caused by the physical injury. 
The all-or-nothing approach creates very high stakes for finding a 
physical injury and this inevitably creates an incentive for perjury. This was 
also true of the old “impact rule” where recovery was dependent on 
showing there was some “impact”; indeed, this effect was a major criticism 
of the rule.119 Limiting the exclusion for emotional and other damages to 
the portion actually caused by the physical injury reduces this incentive.120 
The need for an apportionment might be lessened if the exclusion 
under § 104(a)(2) were conditioned upon the physical harm exceeding a 
specified minimum. Such a requirement would reduce the number of 
anomalous cases where a minor physical injury permits a taxpayer to 
escape tax on the entire recovery, including damages for emotional distress 
not caused by the injury, while a taxpayer suffering the same quantum of 
emotional distress but no physical harm is taxed in full. But nothing in the 
statute authorizes the courts or the IRS to impose such a minimum. 
Moreover, imposing a minimum requirement would raise administrative 
problems at least as serious as those created by requiring an apportionment. 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 See Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961). In abandoning the “impact rule,” the court 
noted that since the rule was satisfied by even a trivial impact and because of various exceptions to the 
rule: 
[T]here is good ground for believing that they [i.e., the slight impact rule and 
the exceptions] breed dishonest attempts to mold the facts so as to fit them 
within the grooves leading to recovery. (1936 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. 
Comm., p. 450) The ultimate result is that the honest claimant is penalized 
for his reluctance to fashion the facts within the framework of the exceptions. 
Id. at 731. See also Harold F. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1, 80–81 (1949) (stating that the only one hurt by the impact rule is the “honest litigant who will 
not falsify . . . .”). 
120 In case of a serious physical injury, objective evidence (e.g., medical records, x-rays, MRI and 
CAT scan images, etc.) verifying its existence and extent would normally exist. Thus a taxpayer falsely 
claiming that a physical injury occurred is likely to assert it was relatively minor, since otherwise he or 
she would be hard pressed to explain the absence of such objective evidence. Under an apportionment 
approach that limits the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages actually caused by the physical injury, the 
amount of the exclusion will be limited where the claimed injury is slight and thus the incentive for 
perjury in such cases will be reduced and possibly eliminated. 
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It would be difficult to formulate a standard specifying the quantum of 
physical injury required and also difficult to assure consistent application of 
that standard once formulated.121 Perhaps this is why neither the Second nor 
Third Restatements of Torts limit the definition of “bodily harm” to any 
specified minimum.122 
The decided cases are consistent with, and seem to support, the 
apportionment approach rather than one that conditions the exclusion upon 
some minimum amount of harm. In one case, the taxpayer was harassed by 
a coworker who made inappropriate statements to her, stared at her, visited 
her office when there was no business purpose to do so, and on one 
occasion, pinched her on the upper arm.123 The pinch resulted in a small 
contusion, which lasted about 10 to 14 days.124 The taxpayer filed a 
complaint against the employer claiming damages for the harassment, “as 
well as the assault and battery.”125 A settlement was paid and the taxpayer 
claimed it was completely excludible on the ground that it was paid on 
account of a physical personal injury (i.e., the pinch). The court rejected 
this claim, noting that the settlement agreement did not specify what portion 
of the settlement was being paid for the harassment claim, for the emotional 
stress claim, or for the assault and battery claim. It ruled that where the 
parties settle claims for different types of the damages without making any 
allocation of the settlement amount among the claims, and where there is no 
evidence that the parties intended to single out any particular claim, the 
court must treat the entire amount as taxable.126 Although one authority 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 See Burke & Friel, supra note 59, at 187 (“[D]rafting a regulation creating a more stringent 
physical injury standard presents its own problems. How does one draw the line between a physical 
injury which is cognizable under § 104(a)(2) and one that is not? Must the taxpayer have received 
medical attention? Obviously, that would not solve the problem. Must the injury be something which at 
a minimum would be considered greater than a bruise, but less than a broken bone? . . . . [W]hat 
becomes clear is that Congress . . . has only created new problems by creating a dichotomy between 
physical and nonphysical injuries.”); cf. False Imprisonment, supra note 84, at 42 (2009) (noting that 
basing recovery on a distinction between a serious and a non-serious false imprisonment “is analytically 
difficult and perhaps impracticable.”). 
122 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 4 cmt. 
c; Reporters’ Note to cmt. c. 
123 Mumy v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-129, 2005 WL 2077789, at *1. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at *5–*6. 
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explains the case as holding that the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) will not 
apply “unless the taxpayer can demonstrate physical harm that is more than 
nominal,”127 a better explanation is that only damages shown to be 
specifically attributable to the physical injury may be excluded. Had the 
parties made a reasonable allocation of the amount attributable to the pinch, 
the court may well have excluded that amount from taxation. Nothing in the 
opinion suggests that the court’s holding was based on the relative mildness 
of the physical injury. 
In another case, the taxpayer claimed a pattern of sexual harassment 
resulted in the aggravation of Sweet’s syndrome (a rare skin disease).128 A 
settlement was reached and the taxpayer excluded the settlement amount 
from her income under § 104(a)(2). The court held the entire amount was 
taxable because there was no evidence that the sex discrimination caused or 
aggravated taxpayer’s Sweet’s syndrome,129 but added that if it did, the 
settlement agreement “did not specifically carve out any portion of the 
settlement payment” to the amount paid for the physical injury and the 
record provided no evidence supporting such an allocation.130  
The discussion in this Part answers a question that has perplexed the 
commentators: does the tax exclusion apply whenever a physical injury 
occurs—no matter how trivial it may be? The answer is “yes” but the 
exclusion is limited to the damages directly caused by that physical injury. 
V. DOES A PHYSICAL INJURY HAVING ITS ORIGIN IN EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
QUALIFY FOR THE EXCLUSION UNDER § 104(A)(2)? 
Consider the case of a taxpayer who recovers damages for physical 
injury caused by emotional distress. Examples might include a women who 
sustains a miscarriage from fright caused by a reckless driver who barely 
misses hitting her; a man who suffers a heart attack induced by fright when 
a bull negligently released from its pen charges at him but makes no impact 
                                                                                                                           
 
127 5 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 24A:5 (Daniel W. Matthews ed., 2011). 
128 Prasil v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1124–25, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2003-100 (2003).  
129 Id. at 1127–28.  
130 Id. at 1128.  
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because it is diverted from its path at the last moment; or a plaintiff who 
develops a bleeding ulcer caused by verbal bullying by a colleague. Some 
commentators have expressed the view that where the origin of the injury is 
emotional distress (as in these cases) all consequent damages, including any 
damages for a resulting physical injury, are taxable.131 This seems strange 
since in each of these instances the taxpayer sustained an impairment of the 
body—the classic definition of a physical injury. Indeed, exclusion of such 
damages would seem compelled by the language of the statute: “gross 
income does not include . . . damages . . . received . . . on account of 
personal physical injuries.”132 Let us consider arguments supporting the 
opposite position.  
A. No Physical Impact 
Note that in these cases, there is no physical impact to or upon the 
victim’s body. At least one commentator has argued that the absence of a 
physical impact means there has been no “physical injury.”133 He asserts 
that there “must be a proximate physical impact causing an immediate 
physical injury or sickness . . . .”134 Thus, he argues that a taxpayer should 
be taxed on damages she received for a physical impairment resulting from 
emotional distress because she “did not suffer a physical injury—an 
impact—from which excludible damages could flow.”135 The most serious 
objection to this position is simply that the statute does not condition the tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
131 Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of Murphy v. 
Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 200–06 (2007–2008); Habib Hanna, Heads I Win, Tails 
You Lose: The Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Taxpayers Under the Personal Injury Income 
Tax Exclusion, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 166 (2009) (stating that “if someone suffered latent physical 
injuries that manifested themselves as a result of a purely emotional injury, then that person is not 
covered by the exclusion . . . .”); Nicholas M. Whittington, Note, Against the Grain: An 
Interdisciplinary Examination of the 1996 Federal Statutory Changes to the Taxability of Personal 
Injury Awards, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 153, 176 (1997) (stating that exclusion does not apply to “amounts 
received for physical injuries that flow from an emotional injury.”). See also JOEL S. NEWMAN, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 138, Problem 2 (5th ed. 2012) 
(raising issue) and accompanying Teacher’s Manual (discussing issue).  
132 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). 
133 Germain, supra note 131, at 202–06.  
134 Id. at 203 (emphasis added). 
135 Id. at 205–06. 
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exclusion upon the existence of a physical impact.136 Section 104(a)(2) 
merely requires that there be a physical injury—a physical impairment of 
the body; this requirement is satisfied in the examples set out above. To 
require a physical impact would incorporate into § 104(a)(2) the discredited 
common law “impact rule.” As discussed above, this would be improper. 
There is no statutory warrant for it; it is not in accord with modern tort law, 
it lacks any discernible policy justification, and it produces inequitable and 
irrational results.137 The Tax Court has allowed the exclusion in cases 
where no physical impact occurred.138  
B. The Physical Injury Does Not Have a Physical Origin 
Commentators asserting that physical injuries caused by emotional 
distress are taxable may have been unduly influenced by the following 
passage from the Committee Report: “If an action has its origin in a 
physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages (other than punitive 
damages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account 
of physical injury or physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the 
damages is the injured party.”139 These commentators apparently believe 
that the language “an action [having] its origin in a physical injury” at least 
implies that amounts recovered in an action not having its origin in a 
physical injury are not received on account of physical injury and are 
therefore taxable.140 Of course, this passage does no such thing. Rather it 
                                                                                                                           
 
136 Wright, supra note 57, at 238 (stating that “[a]lthough a physical-impact requirement might 
provide more clarity in the statute, neither the plain language of § 104 nor the legislative history 
supports such a narrow reading.”). 
137 See supra Part III.C. 
138 In Domeny v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1047, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-009 (2010), the 
taxpayer obtained a settlement based on her claim that her work environment exacerbated her pre-
existing physical illness, i.e., multiple sclerosis. Although there was no allegation of any physical 
contact or impact involving the taxpayer, the court allowed the exclusion under § 104(a)(2). See also 
Parkinson v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1583, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-142 (2010) (allowing 
exclusion of damages attributable to heart attack allegedly caused by the verbal harassment of two 
coworkers; no physical contact or impact alleged).  
139 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143–44 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 481–82. 
140 See Germain, supra note 131, at 202. Professor Germain, in quoting this passage from the 
Committee Report, italicizes the phrase “origin in a physical,” apparently in the belief that it supports 
his position that recoveries received in actions not having their origin in physical injuries are taxable. 
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merely makes the point, which is not immediately self-evident, that even 
damages for emotional distress will qualify for the tax exclusion so long at 
the emotional distress results from a physical injury. It simply says nothing 
about the converse situation, where the physical injury is caused by 
emotional distress. 
C. Physical Manifestations Resulting from Emotional Distress Are Merely 
“Physical Symptoms” of Emotional Distress Rather Than Physical Injuries 
A footnote in the Committee Report states that the “Committee intends 
that the term emotional distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., 
insomnia, headaches, stomach disorders) which may result from such 
emotional distress.”141 Some commentators have read this language to mean 
that any physical consequence of emotional distress is simply a “physical 
symptom[]” of emotional distress rather than a physical injury and 
consequently any damages recovered are therefore taxable.142 
The IRS took this position in a recent case.143 The taxpayer received a 
settlement based on his claim that verbal harassment by two co-employees 
caused him to have a heart attack.144 The IRS asserted that the heart attack 
was a physical symptom of emotional distress rather than a physical 
injury.145 The court rejected the IRS’s position noting that in a medical 
context, “a ‘symptom’ is “subjective evidence of disease or of a patient’s 
condition, i.e., such evidence as perceived by the patient,’” while “a ‘sign’ 
is ‘any objective evidence of a disease, i.e., such evidence as is perceptible 
to the examining physician as opposed to the subjective sensations 
(symptoms) of the patient.’”146 Since heart attacks can be objectively 
verified, they are not “symptoms” and the exclusion applies.147 
                                                                                                                           
 
141 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 144 n.24 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 482 n.24. 
142 See, e.g., Germain, supra note 131, at 202–06. 
143 Parkinson, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1583, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-142 (2010).  
144 Id. at 1584–85. 
145 Id. at 1586 (quoting SLOANE-DORLAND MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 496 (Supp. 1992)). 
146 Id. (quoting SLOANE-DORLAND MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 476 (Supp. 1992)). 
147 Id. at 1586–87. 
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Although I agree with the result in the case, I doubt that Congress used 
the word “symptom” in the Committee Report in its technical, medical 
meaning. What then is the distinction between a “physical symptom” 
resulting from emotional distress and a “physical injury”? Some idea of 
what the distinction means might be gleaned by considering the examples 
that the footnote in the Committee Report gives of “physical symptoms,” 
which includes “insomnia, headaches, [and] stomach disorders.”148 These 
conditions share a common characteristic. In and of themselves, they 
involve no physical impairment of, or damage to, the body—the commonly 
accepted definition of “physical injury.”149 Everyone has had headaches, 
but once they pass, the body is as good as it was before. Likewise, everyone 
has had nights when sleeping is difficult and everyone has had stomach 
disorders, but once they pass, they leave no impairment of the body.150 
Simply stated, the listed symptoms are not physical injuries because they 
involve no physical impairment of the body. The footnote simply makes it 
clear that such symptoms, notwithstanding their physical nature, are not 
physical injuries.151 Indeed, a different rule would eviscerate the distinction 
between emotional distress and physical injury since practically every case 
of emotional distress is accompanied by physical symptoms: tachycardia 
                                                                                                                           
 
148 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 144 n.24 (1966), reprinted in 1966-3 C.B. 331, at 482 n.24. 
149 See supra Part III.A. 
150 See Wright, supra note 57, at 239 (noting that headaches, nausea, fatigue and sleeplessness 
“are indeed physical, but usually do not injure, or produce sickness in any part of the human body.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
151 In Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2005), the taxpayer received a settlement 
for stress-related ailments he experienced as a result of a failed business deal. The court held that the 
ailments (i.e., hypertension, periodic impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary 
incontinence) were not physical injuries but symptoms related to emotional distress. Id. at 688. The 
holding may seem strange given the physical nature of the ailments but note that the taxpayer did not 
show or allege that these conditions either constituted or resulted from any physical impairment in his 
body. Urinary incontinence, for example, is a physical occurrence but need not be caused by any 
underlying defect in the body. As the Mayo Clinic points out, “Urinary incontinence isn’t a disease. It’s 
a symptom. It can be caused by everyday habits, underlying medical conditions or physical problems.” 
Urinary Incontinence: Causes, MAYO CLINIC (June 25, 2011), http://mayoclinic.com/health/urinary-
incontinence/DS00404/DSECTION=causes (last visited Aug.  20, 2012). See also Sanford v. Comm’r, 
95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1618, 1619, 2008 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2008-158 (2008) (treating “intensification of [] 
asthma, sleep deprivation, skin irritation, appetite loss, severe headaches, and depression” as physical 
symptoms of stress resulting from sexual harassment).  
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(increased pulse rate), hyperventilation (increased respiration rate) and 
tremor (involuntary rapid movement, usually in hands and fingers).152  
On the other hand, if there is a physical impairment of the body—for 
example, a heart attack as in the case described above—there is a “physical 
injury” (as commonly understood) and any damages received on account 
thereof are properly tax-exempt. A heart attack is the loss or destruction of 
living heart muscle caused by a blockage of an artery153 and clearly 
constitutes a physical impairment of the body. In many cases, however, 
distinguishing between physical effects that are merely symptomatic of 
emotional distress and those that constitute a physical impairment of the 
body will be an agonizingly elusive task.154 
No policy justifies disallowing the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) where 
emotional distress results in a physical impairment of the body—and none 
has been suggested. The legislative history of the 1996 Amendments 
unfortunately gives scant insight into their purpose. However, to the extent 
the Amendments were motivated by the historical reasons for the law’s 
reluctance to permit recovery for emotional distress as distinguished from 
physical injury, tax-free treatment should be accorded to damages for 
                                                                                                                           
 
152 Narbeh Bagdasarian, A Prescription for Mental Distress: The Principles of Psychosomatic 
Medicine with the Physical Manifestation Requirement in N.I.E.D. Cases, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 401, 429 
(2000) (stating that “it is hard to define a mental condition with literally no physical manifestation. Even 
purely mental conditions have some physical symptoms.”). 
153 TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1416 (20th ed. 2005) defines a myocardial 
infarction (i.e., a heart attack) as the “loss of living heart muscle as a result of coronary artery 
occlusion.” 
154 Unfortunately, the decided cases have provided little guidance on distinguishing “physical 
injuries” from “physical symptoms” that result from emotional distress. See, e.g., Lindsey, 422 F.3d at 
688 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating without explanation that taxpayer’s symptoms “relate to emotional distress, 
and not to physical sickness.”). 
The problem occurs in other areas of the law. Although the Warsaw Convention allows recovery 
for bodily injury, it does not allow recovery for “physical manifestation of emotional injury.” 
Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, 151 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). One district court, in applying 
this distinction, restricted the definition of bodily injury to “physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, 
or any alteration in the structure of an internal organ . . . .” Turturro v. Cont’l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 
170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Although no court has explicitly adopted this approach in applying 
§ 104(a)(2) of the Code, it is consistent with the results in the decided cases. For example, in Lindsey, 
where the court held that certain stress-related ailments that the taxpayer experienced as a result of a 
failed business deal were physical symptoms of emotional distress rather than physical injuries, the 
taxpayer did not show or allege that his ailments resulted from or constituted an alteration (i.e., a 
physical impairment) to any part of the taxpayer’s body. See supra note 133. 
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physical injuries caused by emotional distress. Those reasons, as stated by 
the Second Restatement of Torts, were: (1) emotional distress was 
considered less serious than physical injury; (2) the absence of the 
guarantee of genuineness provided by a physical injury; and (3) in the case 
of the negligent infliction of emotional distress, the belief that the 
defendant’s fault was not great enough to make him or her liable for a 
purely mental disturbance.155 Obviously, none of these concerns applies 
where emotional distress causes physical impairment of the body, because 
there is, in such cases, a “physical injury,” as that term is commonly 
understood. 
Those who assert that damages for physical injuries caused by 
emotional distress are not excludible base their case primarily—if not 
exclusively—on a single cryptic footnote in the Committee Report. This 
position, however, contravenes the clear language of the statute, which 
unambiguously excludes damages recovered for physical injuries without 
regard to cause. Different judges and commentators accord different weight 
to congressional committee reports.156 However, a committee report should 
never override the text of the statute unless it clearly provides for that 
result157 and the non-textual alternative is supported by strong policy 
reasons. That is not the case here. On the contrary, as shown above, the 
footnote is susceptible of an interpretation consistent with the statutory 
language, and those who argue in favor of a non-textual interpretation have 
failed to present any convincing rationale for that result.  
Note that even under the position advocated here—that the exclusion 
applies to physical injuries caused by emotional distress—damages for the 
emotional distress that caused the physical injury remain taxable. Recall the 
“Charging Bull” example posed above.158 In that case, a bull escaped from 
its pen through the negligence of its owner and charged a passing 
                                                                                                                           
 
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965). 
156 See Michael L. Culotta, The Use of Committee Reports in Statutory Interpretation: A 
Suggested Framework for the Federal Judiciary, 60 ARK. L. REV. 687 (2007). 
157 See, e.g., Henry T. Patterson Trust v. United States, 729 F.2d 1089, 1095 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that language of Committee Report “falls short of a clear indication by Congress that the 
natural impact of the statutory language” should not be followed). 
158 See supra Part II. 
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pedestrian. The bull did not make contact with the pedestrian because it was 
diverted from its path at the last moment, but the terror and horror the 
pedestrian experienced caused him to have a heart attack. Under the 
position advocated here, any damages the pedestrian recovered for the heart 
attack (e.g., medical expenses, diminution in quality of life, loss of income, 
etc.) would be excludible. However, damages recovered for the fright and 
terror the pedestrian experienced before the heart attack would be fully 
taxable since such damages were not awarded “on account of” the physical 
injury (i.e., the heart attack).159 Moreover, the heart attack did not cause the 
emotional distress (i.e., the terror and horror) that preceded it and therefore, 
the causal connection required by Schleier is not satisfied.160 This result 
fully accords with the purposes of the 1996 Amendments: damages for the 
pedestrian’s physical injury (and harms that flow therefrom) are excludible 
and damages for the emotional distress that exists apart from the physical 
injury are taxable. Taxing damages for the period preceding the physical 
injury and excluding damages for the period thereafter is, of course, the 
same approach that was taken in the “bruise ruling.”161 
The position set forth in the Committee Report with respect to 
“physical symptoms” resulting from emotional distress is similar, but not 
identical, to the position taken by the Second Restatement of Torts. In 
general, no damages could be granted for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress in the absence of bodily harm.162 The Second Restatement 
explained what comprised “emotional distress” for purposes of this rule as 
follows: 
The rule stated in this Section applies to all forms of emotional disturbance, 
including temporary fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage and humiliation. 
The fact that these are accompanied by transitory, non-recurring physical 
                                                                                                                           
 
159 See O’Gilvie v. Comm’r, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996). 
160 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329–31 (1995). 
161 Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13. 2000). See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. The 
court applied the bifurcation approach suggested in the text in Parkinson v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1583, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-142 (2010). In that case, the taxpayer alleged that verbal harassment 
by two co-workers caused him mental distress, which in turn caused him to have a heart attack. The 
court treated the portion of the damages attributable to the mental distress caused by the harassment as 
taxable but the portion attributable to the physical injury, i.e., the heart attack, as excludible. Id. at 1587.  
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A. The Restatement imposed liability in certain 
cases where the emotional distress resulted in bodily harm. Id. § 436. 
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phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting and the like, 
does not make the actor liable where such phenomena are in themselves 
inconsequential and do not amount to any substantial bodily harm.163 
In contrast, impairment of the body caused by emotional distress (e.g., heart 
attacks, miscarriages, and bleeding ulcers) are not cases of “transitory, non-
recurring physical phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, 
vomiting and the like . . . [which] are in themselves inconsequential and do 
not amount to any substantial bodily harm.”  
The Second Restatement of Torts suggested that recovery might be 
permitted, even in the absence of physical impairment, if the physical 
symptoms persisted for a long time, stating that “[o]n the other hand, long 
continued nausea or headaches may amount to physical illness, which is 
bodily harm . . . .”164 However, the Third Restatement of Torts, which 
generally adopts a more liberal position on the allowance of damages for 
emotional distress than the Second Restatement, rejected this distinction 
between short-term and long-term physical phenomena because it had “the 
unfortunate effect of diluting the definition of bodily harm.”165 
Does the distinction that the Second Restatement of Torts made 
between short- and long-term physical phenomena or symptoms (but 
rejected by the Third Restatement) apply to § 104(a)(2)? Such an approach 
elicits our sympathy, since the symptoms are no longer everyday 
occurrences that are “transitory, non-recurring physical phenomena, 
harmless in themselves” but long-lasting ones that inflict considerable pain 
and suffering on its victims. I think this approach is unlikely to prevail.  
It is true that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to a “physical sickness” 
as well as to a “physical injury.” It might be contended, as suggested by the 
Second Restatement, that long-term physical symptoms of emotional 
distress constitute a “sickness” even if they do not constitute a “physical 
injury.” However, under § 104(a)(2), the “sickness” must be a “physical 
sickness.” More importantly, the Committee Report makes it clear that 
                                                                                                                           
 
163 Id. at cmt. c. 
164 Id. 
165 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 4 cmt. 
d. 
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physical symptoms are to be treated as “emotional distress” and therefore 
under the express terms of the statute may not be “treated as a physical 
injury or a physical sickness.”166 There is no indication in the Committee 
Report that either the duration or the severity of the symptoms can convert 
the symptoms into a “physical injury” or a “physical sickness.” It may seem 
that a victim of emotional distress who experiences long-term physical 
symptoms has suffered sufficiently to qualify for the tax benefits of section 
104(a)(2), but Congress has made the choice that damages for emotional 
distress, no matter how painful or long-lasting, are taxable. 
VI. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL 
SYMPTOMS OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND PHYSICAL INJURIES: THE CASE 
OF PTSD 
Advances in medical research have shown that the supposedly sharp 
distinction between “body” and “mind,” which underlies § 104(a)(2), is 
largely illusory. As the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, the leading guide to the clinical practice of psychiatry, points 
out, a “compelling literature documents that there is much ‘physical’ in 
‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ disorders.”167 The 
Manual describes the purported distinction “between ‘mental’ disorders and 
‘physical’ disorders . . . [as] a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body 
dualism . . . .”168 The case of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
illustrates the problems of trying to apply this distinction. 
PTSD is triggered by a traumatic event (e.g., assault, domestic abuse, 
rape, or war) and is manifested by symptoms like flashbacks, nightmares, 
difficulty in concentrating, intense physical reactions to reminders of the 
event (e.g., dizziness, agitation, rapid beating of the heart, or headaches).169 
Negligence on the part of the defendant, as well as intentional acts, that 
result in the trauma causing PTSD can therefore give rise to actions for 
                                                                                                                           
 
166 I.R.C. § 104(a) (penultimate sentence). 
167 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: 
DSM-IV-TR, at xxx (4th ed. 2000). 
168 Id.  
169 Post-traumatic stress disorder: PTSD, PUBMED HEALTHNATIONAL, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih 
.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001923/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
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damages. Courts have often refused to treat PTSD as a physical injury. A 
1985 federal case, applying Nebraska law, found that a plaintiff who had 
been diagnosed as suffering from PTSD had not sustained a physical injury 
even though he exhibited the following symptoms: nightmares, frequent 
headaches, dizziness, depression, nervousness, weight loss and poor 
appetite.170 Note that these symptoms do not, at least at first glance, appear 
to involve any impairment of the body. 
However, more recent research has indicated that PTSD may indeed be 
associated with an impairment of the body. The hypothesis is that the 
trauma affects the neural networks in the brain so that the amygdala, which 
triggers fear, becomes more active when the body is faced with a stressful 
situation, while the prefrontal cortex, which inhibits or overrides the fear 
response, is rendered less active. The two interactions result, it is believed, 
in the symptoms typifying PTSD. An article published in The New England 
Journal of Medicine states that: 
Recent neuroanatomical studies have identified alterations in two major 
brain structures—the amygdala and hippocampus—in patients with PTSD. 
[Tomography and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)] have shown that the 
reactivity of the amygdala and anterior paralimbic region [which arouse fear] to 
trauma-related stimuli is increased and the reactivity of the anterior cingulate 
and orbitofrontal areas [which inhibit the fear response] is decreased. These 
areas of the brain are involved in fear responses. Differences in hippocampal 
function and in memory processes presumed to be dependent on the 
hippocampus have been found, suggesting a neuroanatomical substrate for the 
intrusive recollections and other cognitive problems that characterize PTSD.171 
A lay commentator summarized the research as follows: 
In sum, the physiological changes that occur in the brain after an individual 
experiences or witnesses a traumatic event can result in dysfunction of the neural 
networks that regulate memory and fear. We rely on the prefrontal cortex 
inhibitory function to override adverse effects from emotional stress. However, 
                                                                                                                           
 
170 Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 757 F.2d 948, 949 (8th Cir. 1985).  
171 Rachel Yehuda, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 346 N. ENG. J. MED. 108, 110 (2002) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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when the prefrontal cortex is prevented from carrying out this function, that 
dysfunction manifests itself in the symptoms of anxiety disorders.172 
A recent case held that the plaintiff, who had been diagnosed with PTSD, 
had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether he had suffered a “bodily injury”: an affidavit by a physician 
concluding that abnormalities in the plaintiff’s brain as depicted on a PET 
scan were “consistent with an injury to [the plaintiff’s] brain” and an 
affidavit by a second physician stating that PTSD “causes significant 
changes in brain chemistry, brain function and brain structure.”173 Likewise, 
a recent federal case, applying the Warsaw Convention, “acknowledge[d] 
that under some circumstances a diagnosis of chronic PTSD may fall within 
the Convention’s definition of ‘bodily injury.’”174 Other courts have taken a 
more restrained position on this issue.175 
If trauma for which the defendant is responsible is shown to cause 
adverse change in the structure and functioning of plaintiff’s brain, then 
there has been a “physical injury” (i.e., an impairment of the body, 
specifically in the brain) and damages recovered for the effects of such 
injury should qualify for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. However, this puts 
courts in a very difficult position. The science on this issue appears to be 
unsettled. Note the tentative nature of the conclusion in The New England 
                                                                                                                           
 
172 Betsy Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American 
Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 203, 219 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). 
173 Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 815–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
174 Turturro v. Cont’l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). However, the court 
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue with leave to amend her complaint 
because of her failure to plead “with the requisite specificity either a brain-lesion theory of PTSD or 
individualized proof of such lesions.” Id. at 179, 182. 
175 In In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999 (Lloyd v. Am. Airlines), 291 F.3d 503 
(8th Cir. 2002), the court rejected plaintiff’s theory that her PTSD was a “bodily injury” since the 
trauma of the air crash had caused a detrimental physical change in her brain. The court advanced two 
reasons for its holding: first, there was no proof that such a change had occurred, and secondly, 
allowance of recovery on this basis would “blur” the clear distinction drawn in the Warsaw Convention 
between physical injury and mental injuries. Id. at 511–12. In Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 319, 326 (D.C.N.J.), aff’d, 93 Fed. Appx. 406 (3d Cir. 2004), the court rejected a similar claim 
by the plaintiffs, arguing that since “all human thoughts and emotions are in some fashion connected to 
brain activity, and therefore at some level ‘physical,’” acceptance of their argument would “break down 
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Journal of Medicine article cited above: there are research findings 
“suggesting a neuroanatomical substrate for the intrusive recollections and 
other cognitive problems that characterize PTSD.” Yet the statute requires 
the courts and other actors applying the law (e.g., taxpayers, the IRS) to 
make a determination based on tentative scientific findings and 
hypotheses—a task for which they are ill-suited. This embarrassing 
situation results from the law’s mandate to distinguish between “emotional 
distress” and “physical injury”—yet Congress has given no reason why the 
tax consequences of damages should turn on this distinction. Note also that 
this embarrassing situation is unlikely to be confined to cases of PTSD, 
since much research indicates that other mental and emotional disorders 
have an underlying physical cause.176 
VII. CRITIQUE OF THE 1996 AMENDMENTS AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
The 1996 Amendments have serious flaws, including the following: 
A. They Produce Inequitable Results 
By denying tax relief for emotional distress, while granting it for 
physical injuries, the Amendments fail to recognize that emotional harm 
can be as hurtful—and in some cases, more so—than physical injuries.  
Consider the case of Ann who ingests a medicine which subsequent 
epidemiological studies establish increases one’s risk of cancer by 50%. In 
fact, Ann does not develop cancer, but for the rest of her life she lives in 
constant fear of that result. Her anxiety sends her into a deep depression. 
The depression causes her to lose sleep and have frequent stomach 
disorders. This in turn causes her to frequently miss work and leads to her 
dismissal. Ann recovers damages from the pharmaceutical manufacturer for 
                                                                                                                           
 
176 See Dawn Capp & Joan G. Esnayra, It’s All in Your Head—Defining Psychiatric Disabilities 
as Physical Disabilities, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 97, 99 (2000) (stating that an “overwhelming amount 
of scientific data proves that psychiatric disabilities are physical in nature”), and Richard E. Gardner III, 
Mind over Matter?: The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Between Mental and Physical Health 
Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 686 (2000) (stating that “[s]cience continues to provide evidence 
that serious mental illnesses are actually physical diseases of the brain.”). 
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her anxiety, medical expenses and loss of income. Because Ann did not 
sustain a physical injury her entire recovery is taxable.177 
In contrast, Bill sustains a physical injury in an automobile accident 
caused by the negligent driving of another party. After six months, his 
emotional health and physical health are fully restored to their prior 
condition. He recovers damages for pain and suffering, loss of income and 
medical expenses. Because Bill sustained a physical injury, his entire 
recovery is tax free. 
It is inequitable that Ann, who is condemned to a lifetime of anxiety 
and the resulting adverse consequences, must pay tax on her entire 
recovery, while Bill, who fully recovered after six months, escapes all 
tax.178 
B. They Undercut the Rationales of Section 104(a)(2) 
The rationales for the tax exclusion are: (1) at best, the recovery 
merely restores the taxpayer to his or her condition prior to the injury and 
thus, entails no gain; (2) the exclusion reflects our compassion for the 
injured party; (3) the exclusion avoids putting the Government in the 
unseemly position of profiting from the misfortune of its citizens; and (4) it 
is unduly harsh to tax a recovery for an injury that the taxpayer did not 
voluntarily incur and would have wished to avoid.179 These reasons are 
equally applicable regardless of whether the recovery is for emotional 
distress or for a physical injury. 
C. They Increase Complexity by Adding to the Number of Difficult 
Apportionments Required Under Section 104(a)(2) 
As the bruise ruling and the “Charging Bull” hypothetical illustrate, 
where a course of tortious conduct begins before the physical injury, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
177 Ann’s insomnia and her stomach disorders will almost certainly be treated as merely “physical 
symptoms” resulting from emotional distress and thus the damages she recovers for them will be 
taxable. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 144 n.24 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 482 n.24. 
178 For other hypotheticals illustrating how the 1996 Amendments cause inequitable differences in 
result, see Burke & Friel, supra note 59, at 182–84, and Hanna, supra note 131, at 180–82.  
179 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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damages must be apportioned between the period preceding the physical 
injury and the period thereafter.180 If a course of tortious conduct produces 
emotional distress that is then intensified by a physical injury, the damages 
must apparently be apportioned between the emotional distress that would 
have occurred anyway and the additional distress caused by the physical 
injury.181 If the recovery is based on multiple claims, some involving a 
physical injury and others not, apportionment must be made between the 
different classes of claims.182 
These apportionments are on top of those that may have already been 
required by prior law. Where punitive damages are included in an award, 
the amount received for punitive damages (which is taxable) must be sorted 
out from damages for the physical injury (which is not taxable).183 If a 
settlement includes collateral undertakings (e.g., a commitment not to 
publicize the incident), the damages recovered for the undertakings 
(taxable) must be segregated from the amount received for the physical 
injury (nontaxable).184 
Making a proper allocation requires a weighing of the relative 
strengths of the different claims and, because any allocation by the parties 
may be tax-motivated, a determination of the parties’ motives. This places 
an undue strain on the resources of the IRS and the courts.185 
                                                                                                                           
 
180 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000) (according tax-free treatment to damages 
allocable to period beginning with “First Physical injury” but taxing damages allocable to period 
preceding the “First Pain Incident”). A similar apportionment would be required in cases like the 
“Charging Bull” where the charge of the bull and the resulting terror (i.e., emotional stress) preceded the 
taxpayer’s “physical injury,” that is, his heart attack. See supra notes 42–44, 95–97, 140–43 and 
accompanying text. 
181 See supra Part IV. 
182 See Burke & Friel, supra note 59, 190–93. 
183 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000) (holding that amount allocable to punitive 
damages is taxable). 
184 See Amos v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 667, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2003-329 (2003). 
185 Burke & Friel, supra note 59, at 190–93. 
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D. They Require the IRS, Taxpayers and the Courts to Make Sophisticated 
Determinations of Medical Causation That They Are Ill-Suited to Make 
As the discussion of PTSD shows, whether a condition is caused by a 
physical injury sometimes involves very sophisticated and often unsettled 
issues of medical causation which the courts and the other parties are ill-
equipped to decide.186 Putting courts in this position seems to serve little 
purpose when little, if any, reason for making tax consequences turns on the 
distinction between injury to one’s body and one’s mind has been given—
let alone justified. 
E. The Lack of a Coherent and Intelligible Policy Justification for the 1996 
Amendments Impedes Rational Application and Development of the Law 
Since Congress’s reasons for according tax-free treatment to damages 
received for physical injuries while taxing other damages are obscure at 
best, it is difficult to decide whether a given harm should qualify for tax-
exempt status based on the statute’s purposes and policy. Rather the 
decision maker is left grasping at dictionary definitions and cryptic 
statements in an incomplete and murky Committee Report. This impedes 
rational application and extension of the law to new and unforeseen 
situations.187 
Below I make a proposal that I believe will significantly improve the 
current law. I am not trying to resolve the long-standing philosophical 
debate between those who believe that litigation damages, at least in some 
cases, should be tax free and those who believe that such damages should 
be taxed. In general, I accept the current status of the law for one pragmatic 
reason: I believe any attempt to make a wholesale revision in the law is 
doomed to failure. My objective is more modest: I want to reduce the 
deficiencies created by the 1996 Amendments and yet address some of the 
concerns raised by the proponents of the Amendments. 
                                                                                                                           
 
186 See discussion supra Part VI. 
187 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 145–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (arguing that a statute should be interpreted through a process of “reasoned elaboration” based on 
its purposes and policies). 
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Each of the flaws listed above results from, or is significantly 
aggravated by, the need to distinguish between physical injury or sickness 
and emotional distress. Consequently, each can be eliminated, or 
substantially reduced, if that distinction is eliminated. Can this be done 
while satisfying, at least in part, the proponents’ reason for enacting the 
1996 Amendments?  
Answering this question is difficult since the legislative history gives 
so little insight into the reasons for their enactment. However, as discussed 
above, the best surmise is that Congress was concerned that amounts that 
would otherwise be taxed in the absence of an injury (i.e., lost income) 
would escape tax when received as damages. Congress specifically noted 
that “[d]amages received on a claim not involving physical injury or 
physical sickness are generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits 
or lost wages that would otherwise be included in taxable income.”188 The 
Supreme Court itself acknowledged in Ogilvie that the law went beyond 
what was required to restore the taxpayer’s human capital: 
We concede that the original provision’s language does go beyond what 
one might expect a purely tax-policy-related “human capital” rationale to 
justify. . . . [since it] also excludes from taxation those damages that substitute, 
say, for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned them. 
To that extent, the provision can make the compensated taxpayer better off from 
a tax perspective than had the personal injury not taken place.189 
Indeed, some commentators believe that the Court’s restrictive 
interpretation and application of § 104(a)(2) in Burke, Schleier and 
O’Gilvie reflected its unease over this anomalous result.190 It is reasonable 
to conclude that Congress was motivated, at least in significant part, by a 
desire to make sure that income, which would be taxed in the absence of an 
injury, would still be taxable when recovered as damages. 
                                                                                                                           
 
188 H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, at 481 (emphasis added). 
189 O’Gilvie v. Comm’r, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996). 
190 See, e.g., Doti, supra note 70, at 70 (stating author’s belief that Court held the recovery in 
Schleier taxable because it “could not accept the fact that Congress intended such a loophole to exist for 
lost wages—a classic form of taxable income.”). 
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Solution of this problem therefore lies in making all damages received 
for lost income taxable.191 At the same time, the existing dichotomy 
between “physical injuries or physical sickness” and “emotional distress” 
should be eliminated. This change would eliminate, or substantially reduce, 
the defects in the current law identified above. Making all damages for lost 
income taxable would carry out in a more consistent and thorough manner 
the intent that a compensated victim’s tax situation not be improved over 
what it would have been if no injury occurred.192 Under the proposal, 
damages for lost income in the cases involving emotional distress will be 
taxed as under current law, and damages for lost income in cases involving 
physical injuries will likewise be taxed. 
This proposal entails its own problems.193 Perhaps the most serious is 
the need to determine the amount of a recovery attributable to lost income. 
                                                                                                                           
 
191 Numerous commentators have advocated taxing recoveries for lost income in personal injury 
cases: Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damages Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 43 (1987); Burke & Friel, supra note 39, at 46; Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Taxation as a 
Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (1985). 
192 Professor Dodge agrees that § 104(a)(2) of the Code, as presently applied, often has the effect 
of overcompensating taxpayers in the case of lost income awards, since he or she pays no tax on income 
that would have been taxed if no injury had occurred. Dodge, supra note 38, at 146. However, he would 
retain § 104(a)(2) but deal with the problem by limiting the tax exclusion to two types of recoveries: 
(1) periodic payments where the each payment is reduced to reflect the tax that would have been paid if 
no injury had occurred; and (2) lump sum awards provided the taxpayer places the award in an annuity 
that is structured and taxed to put the taxpayer in same after-tax position as if the injury had not 
occurred. Id. at 156–59, 166–67. 
My concerns with this approach are pragmatic. Professor Dodge’s analysis is complex and the 
rules needed to implement his proposal would likewise be complex (e.g., varying rules for taxing 
annuity payments based on how award is computed). See id. at 159. Explaining the rationale and the 
rules and then selling them to Congress and the states would at best be a long, drawn-out process. I 
doubt if Congress would adopt them. Certainly Congress made no move in this direction in the 20 years 
since Professor Dodge made his proposal, and Congress did not adopt his approach in 1996 when it 
made recoveries of lost income taxable when no physical injury takes place. Note also that the federal 
government would receive no tax revenue under some of his proposed scenarios. For example, in the 
case of periodic payments, the payments by the defendant are to be reduced to reflect the tax that would 
have otherwise been payable on them. Id. at 169. Under this proposal, the Government collects no tax; 
rather the reduction in the payment serves as an “implicit” tax. For Professor Dodge’s defense of this 
result, see id. at 169–70. However, if the award is viewed as a replacement of, or substitute for, lost 
taxable income, it seems the Government should be entitled to collect the tax that would be payable on 
it. 
193 Professor Dodge notes that if § 302(a)(2) is amended to make awards for lost income taxable, 
an after-tax rate of return should be used as the discount rate in computing the defendant’s lump sum 
payment for plaintiff’s loss of future income. The after-tax rate of return is the rate of return normally 
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However, as shown above, the 1996 Amendments created their own set of 
hard-to-make apportionments.194 The need for those extremely difficult 
apportionments would disappear if, as proposed here, the need to 
distinguish between physical injury and emotional distress were eliminated. 
Thus, adoption of this proposal is unlikely to increase apportionment 
problems. Indeed, an apportionment is frequently required under current 
law to determine the amount of employment taxes payable on the portion of 
a recovery that is attributable to back pay and to the loss of future pay.195 
The apportionment problem would be eased if juries (and courts that 
determine damages) were required to specify in tort cases any amount 
awarded for lost income. Such a requirement would be a proper exercise of 
Congress’s power to assure compliance with federal tax law. Such 
allocations should, as under current law, be respected by the federal courts 
since they result from an adversarial, arms-length process. Manipulation to 
achieve a desirable tax result is unlikely, since the attorneys representing 
claimants will attempt to maximize each component of the verdict: the 
taxable components as well as the nontaxable ones. 
Settlements are admittedly a more difficult problem. The payor of the 
damages may be indifferent as to the allocation of the damages, since the 
entire amount of the payment, no matter how allocated, will often be 
deductible.196 Sometimes the interests of the parties will even coincide. For 
                                                                                                                           
 
bonds) less the taxpayer’s anticipated tax rate on such return. Otherwise, the plaintiff will incur a 
duplication of tax: an implicit tax caused by using the before-tax rate of return as the discount rate and 
the actual tax the plaintiff pays with respect to the recovery. Therefore, Professor Dodge urges that if 
Congress were to amend the law in this fashion, it should send “a clear signal to states that plaintiff 
equity can be achieved only by figuring lump sum damage recoveries on a before-tax basis using an 
after-tax discount rate.” Dodge, supra note 38, at 177. 
194 See supra notes 95–102, 162–67 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
196 See, e.g., Robinson v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 116 (1994), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 70 F.3d 
34 (5th Cir. 1995), where court disregarded allocations of damages in settlement because it found that 
payor was indifferent to the allocations (presumably because it would be able to deduct entire amount in 
any event) and taxpayers had unilaterally determined allocation to minimize their Federal income tax 
liability. Id. at 129–34. See also Lafleur v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 37, 42, 1997 T.C.M. 1997-312 
(1997) (refusing to follow allocations in settlement agreement where defendant indifferent to them); 
FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX: CASES AND MATERIALS 196–97 (16th 
ed. 2011). 
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example, neither party will want to designate any portion of the award as 
punitive damages: the recipient because such damages are taxable, and the 
payor to avoid the ignominy of that label.197 The best answer is probably to 
leave the law as it currently is: allocations in a settlement agreement will be 
respected if they are “entered into by the parties in an adversarial context at 
arm’s length and in good faith.”198 Otherwise, the court will attempt, by 
looking at all the facts and circumstances, to determine “in lieu of what was 
the settlement amount paid.”199 If the taxpayer fails to present evidence 
establishing, or at least enabling the court to make, an allocation of the 
damages, the taxpayer will be taxed on the entire recovery.200 
The important point, though, is that, unlike some of the speculative 
allocations that may be required by the 1996 Amendments, determining 
what portion of a settlement payment constitutes reimbursement of lost 
income comes well within the expertise of the IRS and courts that 
adjudicate tax issues. Indeed, it is exactly the type of determination they are 
frequently called upon to make when, for example, they must determine 
what portion of a taxpayer’s purported salary in fact constitutes 
“reasonable” compensation and what portion, if any, is actually a disguised 
dividend or gift.201 
Some may be concerned that an award for lost income that would have 
otherwise been earned over an extended time period (e.g., over the 
taxpayer’s lifetime) would result in an improper “bunching” of income in a 
single year, pushing the taxpayer into an abnormally high income tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
197 FREELAND, supra note 196, at 196–97; Bagley v. Comm’r, 105 T.C. 396, 403, 409–10 (1995). 
198 Bagley, 105 T.C. at 407. 
199 Id. at 406. For a general discussion of how courts treat allocations in settlement agreements in 
§ 104(a)(2) cases, see Jon O. Shields, Exclusion of Damages Derived from Personal Injury Settlements: 
Tax-Planning Considerations in Light of McKay v. Commissioner, 56 MONT. L. REV. 603 (1995). 
200 See, e.g., Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 895 (7th Cir. 1999). For cases where the 
courts made their own allocations of damages based on the evidence presented by the parties, see Gerard 
v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 604, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2003-320 (2003) and Parkinson v. 
Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1583, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-142 (2010). 
201 Courts are required to make these determinations because § 162(a)(1) of the Code limits 
deduction for payments for personal services to a “reasonable allowance.” See Exacto Spring Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that “primary purpose of section 162(a)(1) . . . is to 
prevent dividends (or in some cases gifts), which are not deductible from corporate income, from being 
disguised as salary, which is.”).  
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bracket. However, this problem can be satisfactorily resolved by enacting 
an income averaging provision. Congress has adopted such provisions in 
the past when the tax brackets were more steeply progressive than today.202  
In short the potential problems arising from the proposal are 
manageable. Once resolved, the proposed reform will result in a more 
equitable, rational and administrable law. 
                                                                                                                           
 
202 See I.R.C. §§ 1301–1305, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141, 
100 Stat. 2085, 2117. See also S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 45 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 45 (stating 
that reason for repeal of the income averaging provisions was the “significantly flatter rate structure” 
under the Tax Reform Act). 
